

## MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

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VOL. IV

MAY 1880

No. 5

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### THE BATTLE OF SAN JACINTO

THE battle of San Jacinto, though a remarkable instance of triumph by a small irregular force over superior numbers of regular troops, is mainly interesting on account of its ultimate results. The defeat of about thirteen hundred men by seven hundred and eighty-three, in a fight of eighteen minutes duration, in which the effective valor was all on one side, and the slaughter, wrought mainly in pursuit, was almost wholly on the other, may be viewed as uninteresting by a mere military student, but not so by the student of history. The reader is doubtless acquainted with Creasy's able and well known work, called "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of History." The actions included in its list, though selected with great judgment, are not all remarkable for numbers engaged, extent of carnage, or generalship displayed, nor for the immediate fruits of victory; but only for the consequences, more or less remote, of the event. They are battles which would have left a different course for history had the turn of success been opposite to what it was. Some of them are important only on that account. The action which the author selects as the most decisive of the many which, before the day of Waterloo, arose out of the French Revolution, is that of Valmy, though it seems insignificant if we cast no glance beyond the immediate field of combat. It was a big artillery skirmish, a drawn fight, with no uncommon display of skill on either side, far less important apparently than the victory won by the same French army soon after at Jemmapes, and less important than most of Napoleon's battles. But to that army the avoidance of defeat on the earlier field was a success. The trial of nerve at Valmy taught the raw French levies that they could stand fire in front of veterans. The Republican volunteer saw that none of his comrades flinched under cannonade, and this made him firm and victorious on the next field. Had there been no Valmy, there would have been no Jemmapes; had there been no Jemmapes,

there would have been no Austerlitz, and no Waterloo would have been needed to avenge it. With as much reason may we say: had there been no San Jacinto, there would have been no Palo Alto. and had there been no Palo Alto, it is highly probable there would have been no Bull Run or Gettysburg. The steps of the outcome I will endeavor to trace.

Successfully as the defensive campaign of 1836 in Texas terminated, the merit of its guidance by General Sam Houston has been a subject of fierce controversy. He had the peculiar traits which create blind partizanship and bitter opposition; his defenders had as little candor as his assailants, and he had less than either. Hence his merits and faults have been themes of exaggeration, the truth, as usual, lying between them. Had he conducted to victory a campaign against such fearful odds, and under the most distracting difficulties, without one oversight or error, he would have been more infallible than Napoleon; and had he achieved success without possessing ordinary courage and judgment, we would have to class him with those heroes of epic song whom the gods made invincible after leaving out the brains. Though a remarkable man, he was neither one nor the other of those impossible creations.

To make an account of the battle of San Jacinto fully interesting it is necessary to tell of what went immediately before it; but in sketching that forty days' campaign, for the purpose of giving my own views of certain points, I shall relate as briefly as is consistent with clearness all undisputed events which are to be found in detailed histories.

Houston had been appointed, in 1835, by the Provisional Government of Texas, a major-general of regular troops, with the right to command all volunteer forces which might be raised in the country, or come from abroad to offer their services; but the anarchy into which that government fell so neutralized his authority that he was unable, as he conceived, to exert any effective control over the command of Fannin at Goliad, the garrison of San Antonio, or the smaller bands of Johnson and Grant, on the Nueces. The result was they were never concentrated, nor subjected to the orders of a single head; they were consequently cut up in detail about the time that Houston took the field. Thus over seven hundred men were sacrificed without any gain to the cause of Texas. Had Houston been on the western frontier during the whole time that those detachments were there, performing no profitable service, he could possibly have saved them by effecting a concentration. His mere presence has sometimes accomplished no little; and had it been more continuously with those troops, he could probably have made his authority (curtailed though it was) sufficiently effective; but during much of the

time referred to he was in the east, seeking to secure the neutrality of the Cherokees and other Indian tribes in that section, whom emissaries from Mexico were endeavoring to stir up to hostility against Texas. He has been much censured, but more I think than he deserved, for his absence from the frontier at this juncture. The Cherokees were more formidable in arms and efficiency than any of the prairie tribes, and their hostility to Texas would put an enemy in the rear whenever invasion should assail the front. This would have been more ruinous than all the disasters I have just referred to as befalling the defenders of the west. The only man in Texas then likely to have sufficient influence with the Cherokee chiefs to secure the certainty of peace was Houston, who, while self-exiled from civilization, had been an adopted member and titular chief of that tribe. In his mission to the east he neglected what then seemed a lesser danger to avert a greater; yet had his time been properly husbanded he might, I believe, have attended sufficiently to both duties. He had from the first been anxious to take the field at the head of a regular force of over a thousand men, which the provisional government had authorized to be raised; and, not appreciating the impossibility of creating such a force promptly, he gave to that object some precious time which might better have been devoted to the volunteers already in the field.

Houston, as an elected member, joined the Convention of Texas, which assembled at Washington on the Brazos, on the 1st of March, 1836, and declared the independence of Texas the day after. His authority as General-in-Chief having been reaffirmed by the Convention, he left that body on the 6th of that month to take command of the few volunteers then mustering at Gonzalez. On that day the Alamo, where Travis commanded, fell with its last defender. The bands of Johnson and Grant, on the Nueces, had been cut to pieces about the time the Convention met; and Fannin, with his command, surrendered to Urrea, after an obstinate action, on the 20th, nine days after Houston arrived at Gonzalez, which was on the 11th.

At this time Houston was forty-six years of age—a man of robust constitution and imposing presence. He had served in the United States Army under General Jackson, and had been promoted from the ranks for gallant conduct in the Creek war; and though he resigned when a first lieutenant, two years after the peace of 1815, he had acquired a fair experience as a soldier, with such military instruction as could be obtained by a man of quick parts in Indian campaigns and at frontier posts. Of his erratic course after he left the army, and rose to high

civilian rank, it is not necessary here to speak. One of its demoralizing effects on him was the formation of intemperate habits, which however were not so strong or continuous as to impair his mental or bodily powers; and while in the field he always made a firm stand against a vice which he had often rallied against, and, in his latter years, entirely overcame. In his military character there was a strong element of caution, with enough reaction under it to keep off dangerous irresolution. If caution at times held him too rigidly, it was, in the situation he now occupied, an error on the safe side; and reaction in him was not likely to become recklessness. His plans of defence he kept to himself; but he evidently resolved to avoid bold aggressive strokes till sure he could rely on his men, or till the enemy's movements or other circumstances gave him a decided advantage. From the first he probably counted on the possibility of being obliged to retreat farther even than he eventually did, before attempting a decisive blow. The people of Eastern Texas turned out but feebly; the West seemed too weak to withstand the invasion; and among the plans which he perhaps thought necessity might impose on him was that of dragging the war to the doors of Eastern homes, in order to force their owners into the field. I believe, however, that nothing short of a defeat, or near overwhelming odds, would have driven him to this.

Gen. Houston found about four hundred fresh volunteers at Gonzalez, but desertion reduced them to three hundred and seventy-four when an exact count was made. Travis had announced his intention to signalize his continued possession of his fort by firing at a certain hour of each morning a gun which might be heard at Gonzalez. After the 6th those guns were no longer heard; and the surmise their cessation created was confirmed on the 11th by the arrival of two Mexicans of San Antonio, who reported the fall of the Alamo. This news was reaffirmed, on the 13th, by the arrival of Mrs. Dickenson and Travis's negro—inmates of the fort, who had been spared when the garrison was massacred. From them it was also learned that a body of about seven hundred Mexican troops, under Gen. Sesma, was approaching Gonzalez. Neither the numbers nor the morale of the raw force which Houston had taken command of justified him in attempting a stand at Gonzalez, for his men partook of the panic which already pervaded the population of the West. He accordingly retreated from the place, at midnight between the 13th and 14th, leaving in the village two of his best captains of scouts, with a small rear guard, by whom, either by or without Houston's orders, the place was reduced to ashes. The inhabitants had left, with the aid of



the troops. Two small guns were thrown into the Guadalupe, and some tents and other property were left behind at Houston's camp, owing partly to lack of transportation, and partly to the confusion which prevailed. Houston's first march was fifteen miles, to Peach Creek, where he met a reinforcement of one hundred and twenty-five men; but, as some additional desertions had occurred, this accession raised his total to no more than four hundred and seventy-four. The next day, on his march to the Colorado, he met a company of thirty-five men. His retreat was north-easterly, and, on the 17th, he reached Burnam's Ford, of the Colorado. Then, after remaining two days on the western bank, he passed over, and marched down the eastern side to a spot opposite to Beason's farm and ferry, having above and below his position a ford, which he kept guarded. There he remained till the 26th, receiving considerable increase of numbers.

Houston's force was composed of splendid material, but had not yet become an army, though the organization commenced at Gonzalez was completed, and the men seemed in fine spirits. It would not be easy in most other countries to find the same number of new, unselected men, who combined the same degree of personal bravery with equal skill in the use of fire-arms; but though a mass of mere individual efficiency may have the force of an avalanche while all feel a common spur, any perversion or rupture of the impulse is liable to convert its unity into a rope of sand. This force, in addition to its newness, had no government competent to support it, or enforce authority over it. It was liable to be demoralized by sympathy with a flying population, and was half paralyzed by lack of appliances needful to mobility and subsistence. Before the arrival of Col. Hockley, the Inspector-General, the Commander-in-Chief was the only officer of rank, if not the only one of any grade, who had been trained in a regular army, or had been in any extensive field fight—the only one probably who had a good idea of general staff duties; and the burthen of details which this threw upon the Commander might well unsettle the equipoise of the clearest head.

Gen. Sesma, with between seven and eight hundred Mexican troops, arrived on the western bank of the Colorado, nearly opposite to Houston's camp, at about the time it was occupied by the latter. This detachment included about ninety dragoons, and had with it two pieces of cannon. It was afterwards reinforced by about six hundred men, under Gen. Cos; but, as well as I can ascertain, they did not arrive till after Houston's retreat. The panic spread through the country by deserters, though it put many families on the road of flight, did not deter men

from mustering to the field; and Houston's force became larger on the Colorado than it was at any other time before his victory. He intended, according to his dispatches of the period, to have crossed the river to attack Sesma, on the 27th, but the hopeful spirit of his men received a severe damper, on the 25th, in the news of Fannin's surrender, brought by a fugitive from the West. To allay the effect of this report, the General affected to disbelieve it, and caused the man who brought it to be arrested as a spy and panic-maker; but the information deterred him from aggressive operations, and precipitated his retreat. He fell back from the Colorado on the 26th, without having made anything more than skirmishing demonstrations against Sesma.

Of the number of men in Houston's camp when he retreated contradictory accounts are given, varying from seven to sixteen hundred. Those estimates are doubtless exaggerations of weakness and strength; but, from all I can learn on the subject, I think his force on the 26th must have exceeded a thousand men, and I cannot learn that Sesma's had yet reached eight hundred. I do not know on what day Houston attained to his greatest strength. Col. Hockley, his Inspector-General, reported the force to be over seven hundred on the 23d, and if it ever arose to thirteen hundred at that place, as is credibly asserted, the increase of five hundred and odd must have come in almost simultaneously with the report of Fannin's disaster. It would seem then that on the 23d Houston could have attacked Sesma with an equal, and on the 26th with a greatly superior force, though with ardor somewhat chilled. But even then the information from the West may not have been so great a damper as was the order to retreat. This depended on whether the bad news acted mainly as an irritant or a paralyzer. Considering what the same body of Texans, after much depletion, achieved a little later against nearly double numbers, we see plausible grounds for the assertion so often made that on this occasion Houston had too little faith in his men, and too little readiness to seize a golden opportunity. A defeat of Sesma then would have brought crowds of men to Houston's camp, and might have turned back invasion from the western bank of the Colorado. The belief that it could have been done still prevails among most of the old residents of Texas, and I strongly incline to the same opinion, but without being sure of its correctness. There were many other things to be considered besides parity or superiority of numbers, and some of those things could be appreciated only by a good observer then on the spot. Houston's untrained force was half made up of newly arrived detachments, and no part of it had been assembled over

three weeks or thereabout. Such an army cannot be handled readily and safely to seize the nick of time for a daring blow, and what Houston's men did at San Jacinto is no sure gauge of what they could have done on the Colorado. When he fought at San Jacinto his army was a month older than when it encamped at Beason's Ferry. A raw force composed of fine material and well commanded, if it holds together under difficulties, is sure, even with little training, to improve by that association which creates a sense of unity and gives consistence to the rope of sand. Under those circumstances a month can give to such material a very knitting growth. The time which reduced numbers, increased efficiency; and it is quite possible that the less than eight hundred who fought at San Jacinto were more morally potent against superior numbers than the thousand and odd on the Colorado would have been against a smaller force. Houston was evidently of opinion that his armed assemblage had not yet acquired a fitness for the risk. When not blinded by passion or prejudice he had a ready and keen insight into men; and this is a question in which we must leave him the benefit of a strong doubt.

Houston's course was still north-easterly, and on the 28th he reached San Filipe on the Brazos.

The convention which had declared the independence and framed the constitution of Texas, at Washington, on the Brazos, finished its labors after midnight between the 16th and 17th of March, by inaugurating the newly-elected President and Vice-President, David G. Burnet and Lorenzo de Zavala, and installing their cabinet. Thomas J. Rusk, afterwards a general in Texas, and later a senator of the United States, took the office of Secretary of War. The convention had been hurried to its closing work by the arrival of a courier on the evening of the 16th, with news of the fall of the Alamo and of Houston's retreat from Gonzalez. The aforesaid body made a final adjournment on the 17th, and, on the day following, the President announced by proclamation that the government would remove to Harrisburgh, a town on Buffalo Bayou, about eighteen miles above the inner shore of Galveston Bay, to which place the President and cabinet repaired three days later. Houston, in his correspondence of that period, censures this removal with more acrimony than candor, as if the executive department, with hardly a corporal's guard to back it, could take on itself the duty of an outpost. When the President left Washington, Houston was already crossing the Colorado, and a week later was on the Brazos, while not a Texan soldier stood between Washington and Goana's detachment then

moving that way. If all of Houston's retreats can be justified, that of the government may be excused.

San Filipe, the point to which Houston fell back from the Colorado, was on the west side of the Brazos, thirty odd miles below Washington, and was the place founded by Stephen F. Austin, the Empresario, as the official centre of his colony, being at the time now referred to the principal town of the Anglo-American section of Texas. Houston met a reinforcement of an hundred and thirty men a few miles east of the Colorado, but this petty gain did not make up for the new drain of desertion. Each retreat left a space of country open to the enemy, and men, whose homes were thus exposed, could not be kept in camp. Numbers left daily, some with and some without permission, to look to the safety of their families.

At San Filipe a garrison of an hundred and twenty men was left under Captain Moseley Baker, while a smaller company, commanded by Captain Wylie Martin, was sent about fifteen miles down the river to Fort Bend. These detachments were directed to take post on the eastern bank to defend the passage of the river, efforts being made, though without complete success, to secure or remove all boats which might be made available to the enemy. On the 29th Houston marched through mud and rain up the western side of the Brazos, and, after crossing Mill Creek, encamped on the 31st in the outer edge of the river woodland, at a place opposite to Groce's plantation, eighteen miles above San Filipe. There the soldiers buried the first and only one of their comrades who died a natural death during Houston's campaign; and though it was a short one, the fact seems remarkable, considering the amount of exposure and hardship the men endured. Houston's object in moving up the river was mainly to get a position where he could more easily communicate with Harrisburgh, and through it with Galveston bay; for the road to that landing, though longer, was over better ground from Groce's than from San Filipe. Groce's ferry, too, was the place where one of the main roads to the Trinity crossed the Brazos, and was as likely as San Filipe to be an objective point to the enemy.

Captain Baker, having taken his post on the eastern bank, received some false intimation of the enemy's approach on the 29th, and hastily caused the town of San Filipe, opposite, to be burnt, after removing from it the best of the provisions it contained. Whether this was done by General Houston's command or not, it was not done, as Yoakum asserts, by the inhabitants without authority. Baker ordered one of his

subordinates, Mr. M. A. Bryan, a nephew of General Austin, to execute the needless devastation; but as the youth expressed great repugnance to the task of destroying a place his distinguished kinsman had founded, the Captain transferred his order to another. Neither has Yoakum sufficient warrant for asserting that the incendiaries merely anticipated the enemy. Urrea occupied Matagorda then, and Brazoria soon after, without destroying either; and we do not know that Santa Ana would have burnt San Filipe had he found it standing. I am not aware that he had yet burned any dwelling on his route thither, but he was prompt in taking hints of this kind, and finding the sacrifice of Gonzalez by the Texans themselves reenacted at San Filipe, he followed their example soon after at other places.

Houston, after remaining two days at the last mentioned halting place, moved into the dense forest which lines the western bank of the Brazos, where his camp was for a while begirt by the inundation of the season. There he remained from the 2d till the 12th of April. At Groce's ferry he pressed for public service a steamboat called the Yellow Stone.

On the 7th, Santa Ana, with Sesma and his command, arrived at the site of San Filipe. Santa Ana, who was at this time the President of Mexico, had, in his presidential capacity of commander-in-chief, taken charge of the campaign in Texas, and now accompanied the advance. After cannonading Baker's position opposite to San Filipe for two days without effect, and finding that a passage of the river could not there be readily effected, he moved with a part of his force down to Fort Bend, where, while he occupied Martin's attention with a cannonade, he secured a boat by stratagem in that vicinity and crossed the river at Thomson's Ferry, at which place he ordered Sesma, with the rest of his command, to join him. Martin's and Baker's detachments, so soon as it was known the Mexicans had reached the eastern bank, moved off, and arrived safe at Houston's camp, which had been shifted to the eastern side of the Brazos. Houston had crossed the river at Groce's Ferry on the same day that it was passed by Santa Ana, thirty odd miles below.

This double pass over was the turning point of the campaign. At this time Urrea, who commanded the coast division, was at Matagorda with about 1300 men. Goana, with the uppermost division or detachment, had been ordered to march with a little over 700 men by way of a ferry above Washington to Nacogdoches, but had had his destination changed to San Filipe; he was now lost in the wilds between that place and Bastrop. The troops forming the centre division were part in the



camp of Santa Ana and Sesma, and the rest, the larger portion, in the camp of Filisoli, below San Filipe, the aggregate of the two being about 3,300. The total, it will be seen, was about 5,300; the rest of the invading army, a mere fraction, if we count only effectives, was in garrison at San Antonio and other places in the west. Urrea, as well as Goana, had lately been ordered to join the centre division. Santa Ana would have done better had he awaited the concentration he had ordered, but sudden change of plan was characteristic of him. He had a passion for celerity and for enterprising detached service, although it carried him ahead of where his station as a general ought to be; and this kind of action had in his career generally been associated with success. So, despising his enemy, and thinking an easy conquest within his reach, he left the Brazos with an advance detachment of about eight hundred men, including fifty dragoons, who formed his escort. The infantry consisted mostly of light companies, and was accompanied by one piece of artillery, a brass twelve pounder. He proceeded by a forced march, burning the few isolated houses which lay in his route, and directed his course to Harrisburgh, where he doubtless hoped to surprise the President and Cabinet of Texas. Though Santa Ana possessed ability of high order, its qualities were ill balanced, and his talent, like his courage, was of fitful character, and this was not one of the periods when one or the other was in the ascendant. He seemed drunk with overrated success. An officer of his staff, Colonel Delgado, whose narrative is before me, describes his deportment on the march as marked by conceitedness and levity, showing at one time a lack of caution, and at another a want of coolness. Pushing ahead of his infantry, he arrived with his escort within a mile of Harrisburgh at eleven o'clock on the night of the 15th, and reconnoitered the place in person, accompanied only by his staff and fifteen dismounted dragoons. In the deserted village they captured two Texans who had lingered there, and learned from them that the President and other members of the Government had left the morning before for Galveston Island. The infantry came up the next morning, and the troops halted till the 17th. Then, after plundering and burning the town, as well as some houses beyond the bayou, the expedition marched down to New Washington on Galveston Bay, south of the mouth of the San Jacinto. Harrisburgh is on the right bank of Buffalo bayou, which joins the San Jacinto just above the mouth of the latter, Lynch's Ferry being immediately below the junction. I speak of the right and left bank as in looking down stream. The march to New Washington was down the bayou and off to



the right of it. The village was reached and plundered on the 18th, and burnt on the 19th. It was supposed that Santa Ana intended, so soon as reinforced, to cross at Lynch's Ferry and move on Anahnac, on Trinity Bay; but at eight o'clock on the morning of the 20th, when he was about to march, the commander of a scouting party rode hurriedly in and informed him that Houston was not far in his rear; on which Santa Ana faced towards his enemy and moved to meet him. There we must leave the Mexican President and turn back to the Texan forces.

At Houston's camp, west of the Brazos, discontent culminated and seemed to threaten mutiny. The army was mud bound, and the camp for a while became an island, where inaction and discomfort intensified the impatience of the men to be led against the enemy. The opportunity, which most of them believed their leader had lost, to strike a blow on the Colorado, was a subject of bitter complaint, often uttered within his hearing; while he had the heaviest of duties in allaying discontent and restoring the discipline which the license of his retreat had impaired. Yet the condition which deadened cheerfulness did not depress the true soldierly morale of the army. While desertion rid it of the least reliable element, the rest, by longer association, grew more conscious of the unanimity of determination. But the Government shared in the restive distrust of the soldiery. Thos. J. Rusk, the Secretary of War, was sent to the camp by the President to look into the state of affairs and urge the General to aggressive operations; and the latter soon after received letters of reproachful tone from the President and acting Secretary. But five days passed between that when Santa Ana reached the Brazos, and the day on which Houston broke up to cross the river. During this brief space the condition of the roads, the unfixedness of the enemy's position, and the general pressure of embarrassment, afforded no opportunity for a blow like that supposed to have been lost two weeks before. Houston probably had sufficient forethought to know that his position would tempt Santa Ana to make a detached movement towards his flank or rear. I infer that he awaited this as his most feasible opportunity. So soon as he ascertained such a movement was about being made, he crossed the Brazos by means of the steamboat he had pressed, commencing on the 12th and finishing on the 13th, when he marched three miles out from the river to Donahu's farm, where he had directed the two outlying detachments to join him. While crossing the Brazos he was reinforced by the only artillery he received during the campaign—two six pounders. When he entered

the Brazos bottom his force was estimated by him and Colonel Hockley, in their letters, to number about seven hundred and fifty effective men, after one hundred and twenty had been left at San Filipe. On the day before Houston crossed the Brazos, a regular report of men in camp returned but five hundred and twenty-three effectives, though a reinforcement of eighty had arrived from the East. The situation told on the health of the men; and there were still some desertions. At Donahu's, however, the entrance of outlying detachments, the restoration of invalids, and some accession of fresh volunteers, raised the force to near eight hundred effectives, making near 1,000 in all.

The arrival of the Secretary of War in camp on the 4th of April had a good effect on the spirits of the men. They had full confidence in him; and it was soon evident that he and the General were in perfect accord. They consulted together on all important occasions; and this was the only quarter in which Houston had resorted to consultation. He was remarkable for the strictness with which he kept his own counsel; yet he was by no means a man of few words; and his proneness to irony and to mystifying questioners in a sarcastic way probably misled his hearers occasionally in regard to his own intentions.

In the war of recrimination, which some years later ensued, it was asserted that the army at Donahu's largely entertained a suspicion that Houston contemplated a retreat across the Trinity before striking a blow, that the Secretary of War had to issue to him a peremptory order to meet the enemy, and that his Adjutant-General found it necessary to frighten him from his intended course by a warning that his life would be in danger from the soldiery if he should take the eastward track. It was asserted, too, that he sent an order to the volunteers, then supposed to be mustering or arriving in Eastern Texas, directing them to halt and entrench on the Trinity. Some of those assertions were doubtless made by respectable men; but, in the discussions of those events, made long after they occurred, we find allegations evidently from a different kind of source. These are so positively and maliciously false,<sup>1</sup> that we must receive with caution others in which truth may have been aimed at but was distorted by personal animosity. It must be remembered that when Houston felt or inspired hatred it was not apt to be of diluted quality. The suspicion referred to undoubtedly existed, perhaps extensively; but I see no reason to believe that it was shared in by the Secretary of War or the Adjutant-General; nor do I believe that the former found any such order, or the latter any such threat advisable. I knew them both well at a later time, and never

heard any allusion to the subject from either. Houston no doubt kept an eye on Eastern Texas, which might prove to be his last field for rally and retrieval, and some of his remarks or measures may have looked to that end. He sent Captain Wylie Martin with his company to the Trinity to aid and protect the fugitive families and do what the situation might require. He did not yet know of Goana's change of destination; and that General might turn his right, as Santa Ana did his left, and push on to Nacogdoches, where the presence of the invader could stir up the Indians, in spite of treaty pledges. Under the circumstances, Houston's order for halting new levies on the Trinity seems quite probable; for, though he expected to strike a blow shortly, until he knew precisely when and where it would be, it may have seemed more advisable to provide for a reserve than for reinforcement.

We can better judge of what he at this time intended from what he soon after did, and from what we know of the man, than we can from stories which have a strong flavor of spite as well as of legend. Inferring from the former premises, I am convinced that when Houston crossed the Brazos he was determined on a blow against the first enemy he could reach, without too much regard to disparity of numbers. The reproach of having heretofore observed too much caution was at length liable to goad him into observing too little. We can afford to allow him common sense and ordinary courage; and if he had both, he must have known that a fight would now be less perilous than flight. Had the situation been one which made farther retreat essential to the safety of the cause, he could not have been turned away from it without a jar or struggle which would have left an unmistakable mark on the recollections of the period. Strength of will he did not lack.

On the 16th of April Houston marched from Donahu's, southeasterly towards Harrisburgh. Santa Ana's move, made two days before, which was easterly, was a turning of Houston's left,<sup>3</sup> and the march of the latter was a pursuit of the flankers on their left rear. Their routes running obliquely towards each other formed two sides of a triangle, and came to a point at the town aforesaid, leaving the head of Buffalo Bayou between them. Santa Ana, therefore, struck that stream on its right and Houston on its left bank. Though this movement was in the general direction of retreat, it was in effect an advance; and the spirits of the men rose with each step that brought them nearer to the enemy. As Houston's route was the longest, making fifty-five miles, it occupied

two and a half days of forced march, and brought him to the point opposite to the ruins of Harrisburgh at midday on the 18th. There the troops rested, while scouts, who were sent across the bayou to reconnoitre, brought in two prisoners, one a courier and the other a trooper. The former bore despatches from Filisoli to Santa Ana, in which there seemed to be reference made to a reinforcement about to be sent to the latter. From the two Houston learned that he was now in Santa Ana's rear, as the Mexican chief had marched down the bayou towards Lynch's Ferry. He immediately resolved to follow on his track, and cut him off from effecting a passage of the San Jacinto. Early the next morning he marched two miles down the bayou, and crossed it with his troops, by means of a shackling boat and an improvised raft. The wagons, and all but the most necessary baggage, were left with a number of sick and ineffectives, under a sufficient guard, on the left side of the bayou. The passage was completed before sunset; and the force, carrying with it three days' rations, commenced its march on the enemy's trail, and, after a ten miles' tramp, halted in the prairie, where the men slept without refreshment. At dawn on the 20th they rose at the tap of the drum, as reveille was forbidden, and resumed their march. After proceeding a few miles they halted for breakfast; and, while it was in preparation, their scouts came in reporting that they had chased back those of the enemy till they came in sight of his advance. Deferring their breakfast, the Texans then began another forced march towards Lynch's Ferry, to reach it before the enemy could make use of it. An advance of about forty Texan cavalry reached the ferry at 10 A. M., driving from it a party of about the same number of Mexican soldiers, from whom they took a boat laden with provisions. This welcome prize was sent a mile up the bayou to a point which had been selected for encampment; for the main body halted when it was found that the enemy did not occupy the ferry in force. Houston's camp was covered by a strip of woodland on a rising ground which lay parallel with the bayou. The enemy, who were now on their march from New Washington, soon came in sight. The Texans had already formed in order of battle, with their two six-pounders in the centre. The ground in their front was an open prairie, except that it was dotted with two groves, one about four hundred yards in front of their centre, and the other about half as far in front of their left. The Mexican infantry with their twelve-pounder took possession of the first mentioned grove and opened fire upon the Texans, who were well covered and out of sight. This cannonade continued for an hour without doing any other

harm than wounding one man, who happened to be the officer in command of the Texan artillery, Colonel Nail. The enemy then sent a detachment of light infantry into the other grove, and the Texan cavalry made a demonstration against their position to draw them out, but, failing to do so, fell back without loss. Soon after this the main body of the enemy's infantry advanced rapidly in column from the position of their artillery. When they had come within two hundred yards of the Texan centre, Houston ordered his own artillery to open upon them, which was done; and, though it was with little or no execution, the enemy retired with precipitation, the Texan cannonade continuing till they had reached a safe distance. Santa Ana then fell back to a position three-quarters of a mile from the Texan camp, and began to improvise a breastwork. In the afternoon Colonel Sherman went out with the Texan cavalry to reconnoitre, or to seize any chance that might come up for a blow at the enemy. He drew fire from their left, and had a slight encounter with their dragoons, when a part of the Texan line, with their cannon, advanced to aid the cavalry if necessary. The enemy's horse retired; and the Texan force fell back to camp. Nothing came of this later movement except the wounding of two Texans, one of them mortally. The operations of the day amounted in the end to nothing more than demonstrations; but what is noteworthy is that Santa Ana at first was evidently willing to bring on a general action then, without waiting for a strong reinforcement he expected on the morrow; and Houston, who probably knew of the enemy's expectation, was determined to keep off the battle till the next day. The Mexicans did not know of his possession of artillery till it opened fire; and, had he withheld its discharge till the enemy were within close rifle range, the combined fire of large and small arms would have been quite destructive; but Houston, according to his own assertion, acted as he did on purpose to defer the main action. The two cavalry demonstrations were made at Colonel Sherman's request; and Houston, in his consent, gave orders looking to an avoidance of any extensive collision.

That night the Texans enjoyed, without disturbance, probably the best meal and the most refreshing sleep they had had since they left Donahu's. Both armies were much fatigued by almost constant marching since they left the Brazos, exposed at times to heavy rain. The next dawn, which arose clear and auspicious, ushered in the memorable 21st of April, 1836. At 9 o'clock a body of troops was seen to enter the enemy's camp by the road which both armies had lately traveled. They were received with a roll of the Mexican drums and joyous shouts.



This was the arrival of General Cos, with a reinforcement of 500 men or a little more. Its approach and probable strength had been announced to Houston by his scouts; but he suggested to the officers and men about him that the exhibition they had seen was nothing more than a countermarch of some of Santa Ana's troops sent out of camp for a deceptive display. But the arrival was too obvious to leave any plausibility to the pretended surmise. In the course of the forenoon several officers waited upon the General and requested that a council of war should be called, which was at once done. The council met, consisting of Colonels Burlison and Sherman, Lieutenant-Colonels Somerville, Burnet, and Millard, and Major Wells, the field officers of the two regiments of volunteers, and the half battalion of regulars, which composed the infantry. The Secretary of War was also present. The question put to the council by the General was: "Shall we attack the enemy in his position or await his attack in ours?" Burnet and Wells who, as lowest in rank, were first called on for their views, were in favor of attacking the enemy; but the other officers preferred to wait for the attack; and with this the Secretary of War coincided. The reasons given were that their own position was a good one, while that of the enemy was fortified, and would have to be charged on through an open prairie by troops mostly without bayonets; and that, when raw militia are opposed to regular troops, it is safest for the former to act on the defensive. The advisability of providing a raft for crossing the bayou in case of defeat, was mentioned by some one, but, I think, was not discussed. The council was then dismissed, the General reserving his own opinion. That of the majority has the fault of allowing the enemy time for farther reinforcements. One was as much as could be prudently let into the slaughter-pen. This was the first council of war solicited or held during the campaign. There was that morning a revival of the old distrust in the ranks because more had not been done the day before, and the discontent of the men probably suggested the request made by the officers. But Houston a few hours later showed that he was more in harmony with the former than the latter.

Five or six miles above, where the two armies were encamped, Vince's bayou runs into the Buffalo on its right side. The branch, which was almost unfordable from its depth of mud, was crossed by what was known as Vince's bridge, over which both armies had passed in their downward march; and it had now just been crossed by Cos and his reinforcement. Over it was the only road from either camp to the Brazos. After the council was dismissed, Houston sent two of his best





scouts, one of whom was Deaf Smith, a man of local fame, with orders to burn Vince's bridge. It was promptly done, and reported to the General just before the impending battle began. It was one of Santa Ana's oversights that the safety of that bridge was not guarded, but not, as I believe, an oversight of Houston that the burning was not done sooner. As he is charged with too much forecast, he would hardly have neglected to have it done the night before, had his object been to impede the arrival of the first reinforcement; and the man who did the burning, a confidential scout, would hardly have allowed the precaution to be forgotten, for he had an eye and brain as wary as his ear was defective.

After the council, Houston had directed some of his officers to ascertain the disposition of the men in regard to offensive operations, and found it favorable. He soon after took a more effective mode of sounding them himself. Approaching a spot near the bayou, where a crowd of soldiers as well as officers was assembled, he cried out to them: "Shall we fight now, or wait till to-morrow morning?" They had just heard with no little discontent of the disagreement of the council, and this appeal had electric force. The response was, "Fight now," and the repetition of it spread from one end of the camp to the other. It is worthy of note, that Houston assumed the offensive side of the late discussion, and put the question only in regard to time. Half an hour later a muster was ordered, and the troops were formed for action.

Houston's camp had Buffalo bayou in its rear; the junction of that stream with the San Jacinto bearing a mile or little less to his left. Santa Ana's camp fronted Houston's, three-quarters of a mile off, in a direction nearly at right angles with the bank of the bayou, the shore of Galveston bay being less than a mile to his right. A marsh occupied the space between the two camps and the bay. On the outer edge of the marsh was a strip of timber occupied by the Mexican right wing, consisting of infantry. His centre, composed of the same, was covered by a breastwork formed of pack saddles, packages, and anything which could be made available on the spot, his twelve-pounder being planted in a gap left in the centre of that barrier. His left was another body of foot, partly covered by the breastwork and flanked on the extreme left by his cavalry. These were the dispositions made of the troops when roused by alarm; but when Houston's force moved, Santa Ana and his staff, with about half of his men, were asleep; yet this, under the lights he then had, involved no irrational breach of caution. As Houston the day before stood strictly on the defensive, there seemed little chance of his now becoming the assailant of a strengthened force. Cos's men had

marched most of the previous night, and the commander ordered that they should be allowed to rest. The whole force, from the President down, had need of it; but the troops were encamped, and their arms were stacked in accordance with the formation above described, and the promptitude with which they stepped into it when called to arms, shows that in minor details they were well disciplined and commanded.

The locality of the Texan camp was favorable for making the needful dispositions unseen by the enemy. Colonel Burlison's regiment of volunteers formed the centre, Colonel Sherman's the left wing, and the two companies of regulars, under Lieutenant-Colonel Millard, the right. The two six-pounders with the artillerymen, nine to each piece, now commanded by Colonel Hockley, were placed between the centre and right; and the cavalry, numbering fifty, under M. B. Lamar, afterwards President of Texas, were on the extreme right. Colonel John A. Wharton, one of the most gifted and estimable men in the army, was the Adjutant-General. Secretary Rusk rode with the left wing. The regulars bore muskets and bayonets, the rest of the infantry rifles. The cavalry had sabres and pistols, and such guns as could be had most suitable to mounted men. As for costume, tattered and mud-varnished kersey, jeans, and greasy buckskin, took the place of uniforms; and the begrimed array, from the General down, might almost have envied Falstaff's ragged battalion. The whole force numbered seven hundred and eighty-three.' The ineffective portion and their guard, left with the wagons beyond the bayou, amounted to as many as two hundred. Hence Houston's whole number of men, in and out of action, was near one thousand. Sherman's regiment included a small company of Mexicans of San Antonio, commanded by Captain Seguin. This was the only contingent of native Texans; but, though most of Houston's men were natives of the United States, the assertion, often made, that the battle of San Jacinto was won by men who had lately arrived in Texas, is false. That description would have applied to Fannin's command, mostly made up as it was of companies which had within six months come already armed and organized from abroad. Houston's little army, however, had been wholly raised in Texas within about six weeks, and was composed mainly of men who had come to the country before the war. Santa Ana's force, including Cos's detachment, was reported by the former after his liberation as twelve hundred men, though in Texas it has generally been estimated at fourteen hundred. The truth, I think, lies midway between the two. A captured Mexican sergeant, afterwards in my service, and whom I have mentioned in a former article

(Magazine of American History, II., 1.) as to be relied on, informed me that he assisted in the commissariat on the morning of the 21st, and knew that the number of rations ordered for the whole command was thirteen hundred. Thereabout is doubtless the true number of the men.

Houston's order to advance was given at 3 o'clock. His three infantry corps, in double file, moved each by a flank till they entered a hollow, which covered them, when each body turned into line, and the whole line marched rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's videttes; the cavalry having already been sent to the front of the Mexican dragoons to draw attention. The cannon were kept a little in advance of the infantry, and when within two hundred yards of the enemy's breastwork opened an effective fire, and were run forward after each discharge, the last one being made within seventy yards of that barrier. The enemy's troops were already completely formed, and opened fire in response to the Texan artillery, while their music beat "no quarters." A sufficient proof that, sudden as the attack was, Santa Ana had time to make needful dispositions, is the fact that he transferred two light companies from his extreme left to his right, at double quick, after the firing commenced. As the ground of approach was an ascension, most of the Mexican balls and shot passed over the heads of the Texans, and did not give them the slightest check. Their advance now became a rushing but well-ordered charge, while the stunning war cry of "Alamo" rang from flank to flank—Houston all the while riding conspicuously from ten to twenty paces in front of the line. He was among the first who reached the barrier. With the exception of a few shots, the assailants reserved their fire till within forty paces, and then discharged a volley, before which shakos went down by the score, ranks were shattered, and drum and bugle silenced; the breaking force of that volley was never surpassed by bayonet or claymore. Almost in an instant, as it seemed, the men of the centre and right were over the barrier, and the Mexican twelve-pounder was taken with a load in it. But rapid as Burlison and Millard were, Sherman was ahead of them. His corps was the first to arrive within fitting distance and open fire, and he penetrated the wood on the Mexican right before the breastwork was stormed. The flight of that wing communicated disorder to the centre and left; Lamar had already charged and routed the dragoons, and the whole surviving force of Santa Ana was flying and scattering in eighteen minutes after the Texan charge commenced. Among the few on whom the Mexican shot told was General Houston, who, when near the breastwork, received a ball in his ankle. The flight of the Mexicans did what their

charge could not have accomplished; the moment they fled the Texans broke after them in equal disorder of pursuit, and Houston found it impossible to rally the volunteers. In vain he rode with his bleeding ankle among the fierce pursuers, crying "Halt! halt!" and following each command with a volley of curses. He succeeded at length in halting the two regular companies, and marching them back as a camp guard, when the pain of his wound compelled him to dismount, and have his boot cut from his swollen foot. Had those unruly victors run with broken ranks and empty rifles against a stout reserve of cavalry, it might have given a wide divergence to the course of local history.

The enemy fled in different directions. The mounted men and officers aimed for Vince's bridge, and finding it burnt, plunged into the bayou, where many of them were sabred and shot by Lamar and his cavalry before they could struggle through the tenacious mud. Santa Ana left his horse in the deep mire of that stream, and, like Sisera, "fled away on his feet," for then he still had a pair of them. Numbers of the fugitives took to the morass on the right and rear of the camp, and were there slaughtered in heaps. At first few or no prisoners were taken. Remembrance of the Alamo and Goliad rendered most of the victors merciless, and the few officers who sought to restrain them, did it at the peril of their own lives. Colonel Almonte had kept brokenly together in retreat about four hundred infantry, who still bore their arms, and rallied them at a grove in the rear, where the surrender which he offered was accepted. This put a check to the wholesale carnage, though scattering cases of slaughter continued till darkness put an end to them. Only seven or eight fugitives reached Filisoli camp. Had the troops rallied by Almonte been regulars of the best grit, they might, to say the least, have modified considerably the triumph of the disordered victors.

Santa Ana, on being roused from his siesta, was at first incredulous as to the reality of attack. He sprang up for a moment into a small tree which had shaded him, and after taking a glance at the assailants, gave his first orders collectedly, but when his troops began to give way, he lost all self-possession, and was among the first who fled. General Castillon, the gallant Spaniard mentioned in a former article (II., 1), it is said, cut down several of his men to stop the flight, and then, finding all was lost, disdainfully walked away while all the rest were running; but he had not gone many steps before he was shot down. His retreat and fall were described to me by a Texan eye witness. The Mexican ex-sergeant, whom I have mentioned, said he was detailed with a guard of



twenty infantry under a lieutenant to protect the twelve-pounder, and replace any artillery men who might fall. About a minute after the rifles began to rattle he found himself standing by the gun with three of his men. The officer and most of the soldiers lay bleeding—the rest had fled. He then did the same, and in a few moments saw Castrillon fall just ahead of him, and at the same moment felt the contusion of a glancing ball in his back, on which he threw himself down between two dead bodies, and enacted the role of corpse for an hour, when a voice in Spanish gave a welcome announcement. "All the wounded," it said, "who are able to rise, may do so safely, for their lives will be spared." He rose at once, and found it was the son of Vice President Zavala who had spoken.

Seven hundred and thirty-eight Mexican prisoners, including two hundred and eight wounded, were taken. The number of their killed was probably a little over five hundred and fifty. The Texan loss, including that incurred on the first day, was eight killed and twenty-six wounded. On the 22d, a party of five scouts lit upon the President of Mexico, skulking through the high grass of the prairie. They did not recognize his rank, for he had shed his uniform, cast away his sword, and disguised himself in some rude Texan habiliments, which he found in a deserted house.<sup>4</sup> What a sad travesty of the policy of Alexander, who adopted the costume of the land he conquered. Santa Ana's recognition by his soldiers as he entered the camp, and his self-introduction to Houston, have often been related. On the 25th, Cos was in like manner picked up by scouts in the prairie. He deserved death for a breach of parole as much as Santa Ana did in reprisal for massacres, of which he was the real author; but both were spared. Of the sparing of Santa Ana, I have expressed my opinion in a former article (II., 10); policy could not have accomplished it in the teeth of public resentment, had not the soldiery already become sated with blood. Negotiation through the distinguished captive, however, achieved what the sword ought to have done without his aid; and Texas was soon relieved from the footsteps of the invader.

The two main causes of this easy victory over odds, were the individual skill of Texas hunters in the use of the rifle, and the deficiency of Mexican soldiers in the use of the musket; and in this action the need of a depressed aim for the latter made their fire less effective than usual; for, as every hunter knows, it requires special skill to shoot accurately down hill. I do not know what the Mexican troops of this day may be, but then the most essential branch of drilling was the one most



neglected. The Texan attack, as I have shown, was not a surprise, as the Mexicans often call it, but its unexpected audacity gave it much of the effect of such a blow.

Among the controverted points in the history of this action, it has been asserted that Houston ordered Vince's bridge to be destroyed for the interception of Cos's reinforcements—that, when Deaf Smith reported the work done, he concealed the fact that Cos had already passed over, and that Houston made his attack under the belief that Santa Ana had not been reinforced. The proof, however, is ample that Cos's arrival was well known in the Texan camp before Deaf Smith was sent to the bridge. One of the published statements, meant to disparage Houston, alleges that the scout proposed to the General the destruction of the bridge, and that the latter demurred because Cos, having already passed it, might have left thereabout stragglers, who might kill the scout. Whether the alleged conversation took place or not, it shows that the narrator was well aware that Cos's arrival was known before the scout was sent. The question whether the bridge burning was first ordered by the General or first suggested by Deaf Smith, is not worth discussing. It was a thing likely to occur to both; and when an act suggested by a subordinate is accepted and ordered by his superior, it becomes officially his; but it is also true that in such cases Houston was apt to be a greedy monopolizer of merit. The immediate object of burning the bridge could only have been to cut off the enemy's flight, with the secondary aim of impeding other reinforcements if the battle should be delayed. Had Houston feared to let Cos and his reinforcements into the slaughter-pen, the burning would doubtless have been done the night before. Houston long after, in a well known and rather out of place speech before the United States Senate, asserted that his object was to cut off the retreat of both armies, with the same motive, as I infer, which Cortes had when he burnt his ships behind him. There was a little claptrap in this. When Houston burnt the bridge over Vince's bayou he did not sink the boat he had taken the day before on the San Jacinto; and, in case of defeat, his most probable, or only possible course of retreat would have been over the river east, instead of over the bayou, west or north. Under defeat he could hardly have got back, even with the help of the bridge, to his baggage-camp beyond the bayou, before the enemy would reach it; but if his beaten army still held together, he could perhaps have passed it over the San Jacinto. The boat would then have been as great a godsend to him as the bridge, if spared, would have been to Santa Ana on the 21st.

The frequent assertion that Houston would not have fought when he did had not his army compelled him to, does not harmonize with his disregard of the council's vote, or with his action immediately after. His appeal to the soldiery was not to obtain the advice or consent of the rank and file, for he generally had more regard for his own opinion than that of the public ; but he was willing to flatter the troops and desirous to rouse their enthusiasm ; and with this mingled an impulse of self-glorification. He no doubt exulted in the fact that the vote of the council was less daring than his own determination, and he was glad to make it apparent.

It is a recognized fact among soldiers, that the assailant of a position usually feels more vim of valor than the defender ; and for this reason a bold commander often takes on himself the former character, when a more cautious one would prefer the latter. Houston was fully capable of both, according as the needs of the situation seemed to demand. If he had been slow in taking in sufficient reliance on his men, he certainly had all they merited now ; and he had evidently made up his mind, not only to become the assailant, but to crush Santa Ana and Cos in mass instead of striking them in detail. On the 20th he wished merely to feel of the enemy and give his soldiers a stimulating taste of combat, to bring on a Valmy before a Jemmapes ; for, with his self-possession and knowledge of arms, his mode of keeping the enemy at a distance with his cannon must have been the work of design, not of stupidity ; and his whole course on the next day shows that he had then reached the acceptable aggressive point. When Santa Ana, after his capture, inquired of Houston why he deferred attack till his enemy was reinforced, he replied that he never made two bites of a cherry. I do not accept this piece of wit, by itself, as testimony. The witness was an interested one, and was, moreover, as good at a game of brag as anybody ; but all the circumstances of the case which do constitute testimony, show that what seems like a boastful jest, expresses a real fact.

Among the chances which Houston is charged with overlooking when he did not accept the offered fight of the 20th, is that of Santa Ana retreating during the night, thus baffling the hope of the morrow ; but after Santa Ana's challenge of the 20th was declined, and while a reinforcement was near, a night flitting might well be left out of the probabilities to be considered. A general action on the 20th would probably have ended in Santa Ana's retreat, which would have lengthened the contest.

The sound generalship of Houston's plan may well be questioned, and it would have been totally condemned had it failed. As a generality

it is the safest rule to strike so soon as your blow will tell, instead of waiting for a better chance to-morrow, and to fell one foe so soon as you can reach him, instead of letting him double on you that you may cut down two at one stroke; but there are situations which justify the disregard of rules so rational and obvious; and success is the only test to prove the justification. In this case every divergence from ordinary maxims tended to the completeness of success. If there was skill in the rashness of San Jacinto there may have been wisdom in the caution of Beason's Ferry.

Houston's effort to halt and form his men when they rushed into disorderly pursuit, though it was what any true military leader would have done, has not only been censured, but the act has been duplicated by popular rumor in the wrong place. I heard quite early from an eye witness that an assertion then current was true, namely, that Houston ordered a halt in the middle of the charge; but on examination I found that the injurious aspect of the story was due to ignorance of terms. The man was truthful; but in his vocabulary the word "charge" meant the whole rush of the assailants on and *after* the enemy. The middle of this extensive charge, which he referred to, was after the real charge was over and the pursuit had commenced. In this way the other version of the halt-order no doubt grew up; and confused recollection, aided by spite, gave it definite shape. To believe that Houston or any man of good sense and ordinary coolness, aided by some soldierly experience, could commit such a blunder is too incredible to merit discussion. Some of Houston's friends, by way of reprisal made a similar accusation against Sherman; but I think no unprejudiced person believes either story.

There is but one more of the mistakes, real or supposed, of the campaign which I have to take notice of. The burning of Gonzalez and San Filipe, whoever be responsible for the acts, was an atrocious error of judgment. It was the absurdity of imagining a Smolensko and a Moscow in Texas. To deprive the enemy of the shelter of a small hamlet and a large village could inflict no hardship in that season and climate, and to destroy the small stock of provisions they contained could not much embarrass him when the prairies on his route abounded with cattle which the flying inhabitants had no time to drive off. Neither object justified the blotting out of so many homes in a new thinly inhabited country, half ruined in other respects by the woes of war,—homes which the invader might or might not destroy; for I have given reasons for believing that few or no incendiary ravages would have been committed

by the enemy, had they not been commenced by the Texans themselves.\* The officers by whose hands the injury was inflicted asserted that it was done by order of Gen. Houston, which was denied by him. Such an order, if it came from him, seems singular in one who was not usually reckless where life, property, or shelter of the defenceless was at stake; yet it seems as little probable that his subordinates, Deaf Smith and Henry Karnes at Gonzalez, and Mosely Baker at San Filipe, should commit such acts without authority, and fabricate orders which had never been issued on a subject so important. During the season of panic and flight the people generally believed that the invader would spare nothing except what could be put to his own use; and many of those about to flee perhaps became willing that any amount of devastation should be committed if likely to incommode the enemy even slightly. They were willing the home which they hardly hoped ever to see again should be burnt for the purpose of destroying its contents, which the owner was unable to carry off, but the invader perhaps might be. During such a season strong minds sometimes catch the illusions of weak ones; but if Houston was for a brief time thus infected, it is the only occasion I can call to mind on which he gave way to a ruinous popular fallacy. There is one slender chain, only one hypothesis, so far as I can see, which can save both the General and his subordinates from the charge of folly and falsehood. I do not know whether the alleged orders were given directly by the former to the latter, or through a third person. If it was through such a medium the right meaning of the orders may have become perverted; for it was a time when almost every mind was in a whirl of confusion.

Gen. Houston, who began to suffer much from his wound, sailed for New Orleans on the 11th of May to seek better medical treatment and accommodation than the quarters where he was afforded. As use had been made of Santa Ana, while a prisoner, for the purpose of negotiation, he could not now, without dishonor, be made a subject of reprisal or punishment; and, about five weeks after the battle, President Burnet of Texas, proposed to release the captive President of Mexico under a personal pledge, miscalled a treaty, that the latter, when free, should exert his influence, and what power he might recover, to bring about peace and a recognition of Texan Independence by Mexico, with the Rio Grande for a boundary between the two countries. The personal arrangement was so near being carried out that Santa Ana was placed on board of an armed Texan schooner to be sent to Vera Cruz, when the design was thwarted by a popular outbreak against it, backed by a body

of volunteers from New Orleans. Santa Ana was in consequence brought on shore and recommitted to the condition of a prisoner. About seven months later he was unconditionally released by Gen. Houston, who, after his return from the United States, was elected President of Texas. The Mexican officers were released a few months later, as were also the soldiers, most of whom remained voluntarily in the country.

The immediate result of the battle of San Jacinto was the establishment of the Republic of Texas, which, weak as it was, maintained its independent existence for ten years, through a state of nominal and sometimes actual war, till annexation made it one of the states of this Union; and annexation brought consequences, in which, not merely Texas and the United States, but the world is deeply interested. It is not my intention to introduce a synopsis of the history of the short lived Republic; but it is proper, before I come to my closing remarks, that I should take a more comprehensive view than I have yet done of him who forms the central figure in what I have narrated.

To depict fully the anomalous character of Sam Houston would require an abler pen, and more pages than I can give to the subject. When a metallic statue is cast in a mould of the finest proportions, a lack of filling out in certain parts may mar a symmetry which would otherwise be perfect. Like this was the character of Houston, a man of Scotch-Irish descent, and a native of Virginia, bred in Tennessee. He had received little more than a primary education; yet he was powerful in the use of strong, correct, and often polished Saxon speech. He read few books, yet he had a marvellous faculty for picking up knowledge without their aid. His manners could be, and often were of the most dignified courtesy; and, when state ceremony took its place amid rough surroundings, he was "every inch a king." He was great in great things, and little in small things, and more or less erratic in all things. In petty and personal politics he was a low unscrupulous demagogue; but in matters of high import he generally rose to the rank of a statesman, far-seeing, consistent, and apparently of conscientious aims; yet in high as well as in low affairs he at times accomplished good ends by the indirection to which he was prone. He had a power of eloquence and personal magnetism which often drew applause and approval of measures from a crowd which an hour before had been loading him with curses; yet there was in his nature an irrepressible vein of sarcasm which was continually converting mere dislike into hatred. The source of this was preponderant self-esteem which could not brook opposition. This propaganda of self-worship showed itself in the external trickery he practiced to produce stage effect; yet no one saw through a designing



charlatan or pretender with a keener glance than he. He was adroit in taking advantage of any temporary feeling which could be turned to his advantage; but popular fallacies, periodical waves of illusion, took no hold of his mind. Partizanship for and against him took the fierce tone it usually does when a leader is upheld in spite of gross defects, and assailed in spite of great capacity. Men took sides according as their eyes rested mainly on the perfect or imperfect portions of the cast. Good and sensible men, it is true, were found among his opponents; and knaves and fools among his supporters; but there was one class of patriots who always fell into line with the former. If you met with a man who wished to put into operation any ruinous speculation, any impracticable scheme of finance, any stroke of bad faith, or any piratical enterprise, to him you need only mention "Old Sam" to draw forth cursory remarks. If a man is known by the company he keeps, he may be known also by the kind of men who hate him. Whatever errors Houston may have committed as a General and a magistrat , I believe that no other man then prominent in Texas would have done so well. Had he been the executive head of a powerful nation he would, with all his faults, probably have stood above the average of such rulers, for among those who have attained to such historic rank there have been some men of less capacity and others of worse defects of character.

Houston, who succeeded to Burnet, served two terms as President of Texas, with the administration of Lamar between them, and was succeeded by Anson Jones, the last occupant of the chair. Burnet and Lamar were men of talent and character; but Houston and Jones alone can be classed as statesmen, though inferior in personal traits to the other two.

The history of the Republic of Texas is much of it a history of popular illusion; and Houston did more than any other one man to avert its ruinous effects. In fighting against it, during his two administrations, he issued over eighty vetoes; and, though many of them were overruled, there was enough of the element of hard sense and anti-humbug in the Texan Congress to sustain him in the most important ones, and enough of the reflective element in the people to appreciate, in the end, the wisdom of most of those he had failed to carry out. It was largely due to his wise administration of affairs that the country after great struggles, was brought to a comparative state of prosperity, which created in the two leading powers of Europe a strong interest in the political and commercial future of Texas. This led to a desire in those powers to obtain peace for Texas, with a recognition of her independence by Mexico, but above all to secure with permanence, through



solemn diplomatic pledges, the separate national existence of the Republic. This awakened the jealousy of the United States, and created there, for the first time, a strong party in favor of annexation, a measure which was at length provided for by a Joint Resolution of the United States Congress. At the same time British and French diplomacy procured for Texas the opportunity of choosing between recognized independence, with a pledge to continue nationally separate on one hand, and annexation to the United States on the other. The question was submitted to the people; and annexation took the preference by an overwhelming vote. In February, 1846, annexation was consummated, and, as Anson Jones announced in his valedictory, the Republic of Texas was no more.

The annexation of the new State brought with it a war with Mexico; and the treaty which ended that war brought to the United States a vast accession of domain for the North and South to quarrel about; for it was territory in which slavery had no legal existence when it was acquired. This created sectional parties whose growing bitterness culminated in the secession of the South and civil war. It is true there had long been a tendency of the North and South to come into collision; but the conflict would not have been irrepressible had there been no territorial spoils to stimulate it. The failure of nullification had given a backset to Calhounism which would not again have become perilous had no new domain opened so early to the South the hope of extension. It may also be true that latent causes for a future war between the United States and Mexico faintly existed before 1835; and there was in the former Republic a natural hankering after expansion of boundaries; but had Texas never revolted, or had her revolt been subdued, those tendencies would not have been brought into rapid operation; and probably no acquisition of domain would have accrued till after the growing preponderance of the North had rendered hopeless to the South a resort to disunion and war. Thirty or even twenty years later than the date of the Wilmot proviso, that measure, had it then come up, would have been submitted to as inevitable.

This brings me back to a remark I made in the beginning. As Valmy was the parent of Jemmapes, and consequently the progenitor of Austerlitz and Waterloo, so San Jacinto begot Palo Alto, and Palo Alto begot Bull Run and Gettysburg. A small rock at the source may give a wide divergence to a river, and a petty contingency at a critical point may thus turn the course of history. The soldier's exultation in success is apt to overlook the dead chances of war, which, had they lived, would have reversed his good fortune. When Houston's only

drum beat the reveille of April 21st, 1836, the Republic of Texas was but fifty days old; and its first footing looked very much like its last legs. A few hours after that roll of morning drum came the battle. Its crisis was when the Mexican infantry broke in flight and the Texans broke after them in disorderly pursuit. If Santa Ana had then but had three hundred of his best cavalry in reserve—and he would doubtless have had such backing if Urrea's dragoons instead of Cos's foot had formed his reinforcement—then I fear the infant Republic would not have lived to a marriageable age, and could not have been annexed. Consequently there would have been no Palo Alto—no Buena Vista where Jeff Davis first became a hero—no Cherubusco which went before the treaty of Mexico—no acquisition—at least in that era) of wide domain to turn the brain of the South. There would have been no Southern Confederacy. Jeff Davis would have lived and died a thrifty planter and local politician of Mississippi, unsung as well as unhung; and the fruitless "sour apple tree" would never have been planted even in imagination. I will not attempt to conjecture how far institutions and the spread of population, as well as national and sectional feelings, would have differed from what they actually are, had national unity never received a perilous shock; nor will I express either gratification or regret at the course events have taken; for I have no wish to exalt in what has been so calamitous to millions, nor to rebel against the "Divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them as we may."

R. M. POTTER

<sup>1</sup> The most absurdly malicious of those stories came from a discarded aid-de-camp of Houston, named Perry. He came North and became a public lecturer and also a preacher, making the incapacity and cowardice of Houston the burthen of his lectures, if not his sermons. In one of his lectures he went so far as to assert that Houston was not on the field at all, but in his tent when the battle was fought, and that, if really wounded, he had probably wounded himself for the sake of appearances.

<sup>2</sup> In using these terms, I am supposing Houston to face to the west, and Santa Ana to the east.

<sup>3</sup> On the last anniversary of the battle of San Jacinto, April 21, 1879, it was ascertained that over sixty of the seven hundred and eighty-three men who took part in that action were still living. I do not recollect the exact number.

<sup>4</sup> Among the minor inaccuracies of Yoakum is that of saying that Santa Ana, when taken, was dressed in the clothes of one of his own soldiers. In his own report, made after liberation, he tells of obtaining the garments in the way I have mentioned; and Colonel Delgado's description of them tends to corroborate the statement.

<sup>5</sup> The Mexican troops exhibited very little of that spontaneous destructiveness for which the great whittling nation of this hemisphere is distinguished; and it became proverbial in Texas that one volunteer from the United States usually committed more wanton waste than ten soldiers of the invader.



of the Northern Part of  
NEW YORK ISLAND,

*Surveyed Nov., 1776,*

BY  
C. J. SAUTHIER.

*Published by Wm. Faden,*  
LONDON, 1777.




EAST NEW JERSEY

HUDSONS or NORTH RIVER

CHESTER COUNTY

W E S T

**A. BARRACKS BUILT BY THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR WINTER QUARTERS AND WHICH THEY BURNT UPON THE MOVEMENT OF THE KING'S ARMY TO FROGS POINT.**



## THE BATTLE OF HARLEM PLAINS

Saturday, the 16th September, 1876, the New York Historical Society celebrated the one-hundredth anniversary of the battle of Harlem Plains on the field of action, and subsequently published the able oration of Mr. John Jay,\* with an appendix, containing all the known accounts of and allusions to the action, American, British and Hessian. These materials, gathered by the Society with industry and care, were placed in the hands of the orator, and from them and a careful personal examination of the ground in company with numerous persons who, by family tradition, long residence on the spot or in the vicinity, were most competent to decide upon the precise localities mentioned by contemporaneous writers, the account of the battle was prepared.

It was presumed that this exhaustive publication had set at rest all doubts concerning the battle and the ground on which it was fought. To general astonishment, however, in a recent number of the History of New York (Vol. II., No. 3), Mrs. Martha J. Lamb describes the battle as having taken place on the heights in the neighborhood of the Morris House, more than a mile to the northward of Vandewater's Heights, where the action really occurred. The Roger Morris House, better known in our day as the Jumel Mansion, stands north of the line of One Hundred and Sixty-first Street, while the Vandewater or Bloomingdale Heights are to the southward of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street. Harlem Heights and Bloomingdale Heights are divided by the Hollow Way as the natural break was called, through which One Hundred and Twenty-fifth and One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Streets now run. These streets end at the Eleventh Avenue, from which point the line of the old Hollow Way is traversed to the river by the local streets, Manhattan and Lawrence. This is now the site of Manhattanville. The southern extremity of the Harlem Heights overlooking the Hollow Way was known as the Point of Rocks, a bold, sharp out-jutting, which has been cut down in the street opening. The northern extremity of Bloomingdale Heights is also a rocky formation, but not as bold or sharp as that which faces it from the opposite side of the valley, about three hundred yards distant, as just described.

In the transfer of the scene of action from the southern heights to those north of the Hollow Way the author of the recent History of New York has closely followed the views expressed by Mr. Erastus C.



Benedict in a paper read before the New York Historical Society, February 5th, 1878, a paper quoted by Mrs. Lamb, but not as yet made public.

The slightest examination of the ground, even at this day, should suffice to convince any person that Washington could never have committed such a military blunder as to have neglected to hold the southern extremity of the heights on which his army was encamped; a position which from its natural formation was the most defensible of the entire island, commanding in its front the Harlem Plains and on its flank the King's Highway, the only thoroughfare, which skirted its eastern base.

Vandewater's Heights, where the engagement occurred, was not occupied by either army, and formed a neutral ground between the American outposts and the advance line of the British picket guard posted on the hills south of the depression known as McGowan's Pass, the formation of which has been somewhat altered in the laying out of the Central Park, and in the woods on the high ground to the westward extending to the Hudson and across the old Bloomingdale road. Mr. Jay in his address succinctly described these two positions.

The headquarters of the British Commander, General Sir William Howe, were at the house of Mr. Apthorpe, which stands at the corner of Ninth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, and is now known as Elm Park. The encampment of the British extended from the East River, where General Howe's right rested on Horen's Hook near Eighty-ninth Street, to the North River, where his left was at Bloomingdale, the distance being about two miles and both flanks being covered by his ships. The encampment extended from the fourth to the eighth mile-stone.

On the heights occupied by the Americans, between the ninth and tenth mile-stones, southwest of the Roger Morris House, our troops were preparing to form the lines afterward completed between the Hudson River on the west and the Harlem River on the east, over a broken surface with breastworks, entrenchments and *abattis*.

Here it was intended "to make a grand stand." Both sides of the King's Bridge were carefully fortified, making this the strongest point. The division of the army lying near the Roger Morris House extended southwardly to near the Hollow Way running from Harlem Plain to the Hudson River at the site of the present Manhattanville, a natural break between the Harlem and the Bloomingdale Heights. Between the Point of Rocks (the southern extremity of the Harlem Heights, now being cut away, the property of the Convent of Sacred Heart), and McGowan's Pass at the northern extremity of the Central Park, lying on the eastward of Bloomingdale Heights, intervened a low ground known as the Harlem

Plain. The Point of Rocks at One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Street was the advance post of the American army, and on the hill slope below McGowan's Pass, at One Hundred and Ninth Street, a mile and half distant, was the advance post of the British army. The picket lines of each army extended beyond these points into the plains and along the ridge which overlooks them. \* \* \* \*

On the morning of Monday, the 16th of September, Washington concluded a letter to Congress on the affair at Kip's Bay, with the remark, "I have sent out some reconnoitring parties to gain intelligence, if possible, of the disposition of the enemy." From the contemporaneous authority of an officer engaged in the affair, it appears that a scouting party of the Regiment of Rangers, a body of picked men under the command of Lieut. Colonel Thomas Knowlton, set out before day-break with instructions to ascertain the position of the enemy's advanced guard. Passing over the ridge which we have described as the Bloomingdale Heights, then known as the Vandewater Heights (they are so described in Sir William Howe's despatch), they pushed through the woods until, near the southern extremity of this ridge, they came at day-break upon a large party of the British light infantry, who rapidly advanced upon them. A sharp skirmish ensued, until Knowlton, perceiving that with their superior numbers they were turning his flank, ordered a retreat. His men fell back in an orderly manner to the northernmost end of the ridge, where close by our advance posts a second stand was made. Meanwhile, the firing had attracted attention, and soon after Washington's morning despatches were sent to Congress, rumors reached the headquarters of a movement by the enemy, considerable bodies of whom were showing themselves at the lower end of the plains.

Adjutant-General Joseph Reed, as he himself informs us, was sent to the front to learn the truth, and went down to the most advanced guard picketed on the plain below the Point of Rocks. He here fell in with the party of Knowlton, who had been driven from the hill, and while Reed was talking to the officer in command the enemy showed themselves and opened fire at a distance of fifty yards. The Americans behaved well, stood and returned the fire till overpowered by numbers (ten to one is Reed's estimate), as they retreated, the enemy advancing with such rapidity that they were in possession of the house in which Reed conversed with the officer five minutes after he left it.

Reed, encouraged by the behavior of the men, started for headquarters to make his report and ask for reinforcements. Meanwhile Washington had mounted his horse and ridden down to our advanced posts. Hardly had Reed reached him when the light infantry showed themselves in view, and in the most contemptuous manner sounded their bugles as is usual after a fox chase. This insulting behavior brought a blush to the cheeks of the officers, and caused their blood to tingle with shame. It showed them the contempt in which they were held by their adversaries and seemed to crown their disgrace.

On reconnoitring the situation of the enemy, Washington saw that there was

an opportunity for a successful action in which, under favorable conditions, the morale of the army could be restored, and, to use his own words, he formed the design of "cutting off such of the enemy's troops as might advance to the extremity of the woods." This wood was on the northernmost spur of the Bloomingdale Heights, which overlooked the hollow way and was divided from a similar spur opposite at the Point of Rocks by a gully or ravine at the foot of which lay a round meadow known in the topography of the day as Matje (or Mutje) Davits Fly.

Washington learning that the body of the enemy who kept themselves concealed was about three hundred, ordered three companies of Colonel Weedon's regiment from Virginia, under the command of Major Andrew Leitch, and Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton with his Rangers, to try and get in their rear, while a disposition was made as if to attack them in front and to draw their attention that way. Knowlton, who was familiar with the ground, seems to have guided his party by the left flank of the enemy, through the woods of the western slopes of the Bloomingdale Ridge in which he had fought in the morning, in order to fall upon their rear. Leitch, with his Virginians, unacquainted with the field, was put under the guidance of Adjutant-General Reed. It is worth while here to notice that the Virginia troops, which were this day under Leitch, had only arrived the day preceding, having been ordered from the command of General Mercer in New Jersey, and had joined the camp by way of Burdett's Ferry, facing Fort Washington. Meanwhile at ten o'clock a demonstration or feint was made on the front which had the effect intended by Washington. The British troops immediately ran down the hill to the round meadow at its foot. Here, in the words of General Clinton, who was in the action during the greater part of the day, and whose report to the New York Convention is the most detailed and intelligible account of it, they were opposed with spirit and soon made to retreat to a clear field about two hundred paces (eight hundred feet distant) south-east of the fly or meadow, where they lodged themselves behind a fence covered with bushes. This cleared field we take to have been to the east and somewhat south of the point of the ridge facing the Point of Rocks. A smart firing began, but at too great a distance to do much execution, when a couple of field pieces being brought to bear upon the British, and at the second discharge they again fell back, retreating up the eastern slope of the hill. At this moment Major Leitch and his command came upon the field, but misled by the movements of the regiment in action, who seem to have hailed them as they appeared on the plain, were diverted from the path by which Reed intended to lead them, around the right flank of the British to their rear, where he hoped to make a junction with Knowlton's Rangers. Leitch's command evidently came from the lines by the Kings Bridge road, and their course was to have been by an irregular road, which, leaving it, crossed the plain, ran along the eastern slope of the ridge and passed over it about 112th street, where the line of trees now standing marks its course, connecting with the Bloomingdale road at its intersection with the present Eleventh avenue. Reed, finding it impossible to

check their ardor, accompanied them. They joined the regiment in action; the feint was now turned into an attack. In a few minutes, in the words of Reed, our brave fellows mounted up the rocks, attacked the enemy, and a brisk action ensued. Major Leitch fell presently, after the close fighting began, wounded with three balls. In a buckwheat field on the top of the hill, which General Clinton describes as four hundred paces—sixteen hundred feet distant—(and here we must remark that there can be no doubt about the accuracy of these distances, Clinton himself having surveyed the ground a few years previously to settle the Harlem boundary), the British troops met the 42d Highlanders, who, dispatched at eleven o'clock, had moved up on a double trot without stopping to draw breath, to the support of the Light Infantry, whose distance from their lines had caused general alarm at Howe's headquarters.

The effect of the undue and unexpected precipitation on the part of the American troops ordered to make the feint, was to cause the attack to be made too soon, and rather in flank than in the rear, thus thwarting the well-arranged plans of Washington. The interference with his orders was pointedly referred to in the General Orders of the next day, in the remark that "the loss of the enemy yesterday would undoubtedly have been much greater if the orders of the Commander-in-Chief had not in some instance been contradicted by some inferior officers, who, however well they might mean, ought not to presume to direct." At the same time the Virginians of Leitch's command received the thanks of Washington for their gallantry.

On receiving their reinforcements, the British made their second stand. Here it is probable that Knowlton made his appearance on the British left flank. In the buckwheat field, which is located to the eastward of the Bloomingdale Asylum, on the line of 118th street, a brisk action commenced, which continued near two hours. In this fight, in which, in the words of General Heath, there was good "marksmanship on both sides," Colonel Knowlton fell about noon. The officer of the Rangers, whose account of the early morning skirmish we have freely quoted, caught him in his arms, and sent him off the field by two of his men, and he was taken to our lines on the horse of Adjutant-General Reed, probably by the road we have described, which in fact is the only road laid down on the maps of the period, and the only path practicable for a horse.

Knowlton behaved with the greatest courage, and accepted his fate with brave composure. "He seemed," wrote one of his officers, "as unconcerned as though nothing had happened to him." His last inquiry was as to the result of the action. Notwithstanding the loss of their leaders, the men persevered and continued the engagement under the lead of the captains, until Washington, finding that they needed support, advanced part of Colonel Griffiths' and Colonel Richardson's Maryland regiments, with some detachments from the eastern regiments who were nearest the scene of action, who charged the enemy with great intrepidity. Among these troops were Captain Beatty of the Maryland line, Major Mantz with three

rifle companies of the same troops, Major Price with three of the Independent companies of Maryland troops, and three other companies of the Maryland Flying Cavalry, a battalion of Virginians, and some Southern troops. Thus reinforced, the Americans pushed on with fresh vigor. Generals Putnam and Greene, with Tilghman and other officers of Washington's staff, joined in the engagement, and animated the soldiers by their presence. Greene, in his account of the battle, speaks of the noble behavior of Putnam and Adjutant-General Reed. The British also received a considerable addition to their force, which appears from the official report of Lord Howe to have consisted of "the reserve with two field pieces, a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, and a company of chasseurs," under the command of Brigadier-General Leslie. Notwithstanding this assistance, they were driven from the buckwheat field into a neighboring orchard. This orchard was a field north of the line of 116th street, where the remains of the old trees were visible until about the year 1866, when the land was cleared. An ineffectual attempt was made by the British for a further stand, but they were again driven across a hollow and up a hill not far distant from their own encampment. This hollow was undoubtedly the dip of land between the Bloomingdale and McGowan's Heights, and the hill the slope of the latter elevation.

Here the Americans, having silenced the British fire in great measure, Washington judged it prudent to order a retreat, fearing that the enemy, as he afterwards learned was really the case, were sending a large body to support their party, which would have involved his drawing supports from his strong position on the Harlem Heights, and have brought on a general engagement, which he was determined to avoid. The war, as he had written Congress, must be a "war of posts," and he had no thought of jeopardizing the cause by a battle in the open field—at least, not till he had thoroughly tried the temper of his troops. The Von Lansing battalion was seen to draw near; the two other German battalions, under Von Donop, occupied McGowan's Pass; and from eight to ten thousand men were under arms, hidden by the hill to which the enemy were being driven. The American troops obeyed the recall ordered by Washington, although the "pursuit of a flying enemy was so new a scene that it was with difficulty our men could be brought to retreat, which was, however, effected in very good order." \* \*

The battle, as we have described it, was chiefly fought upon Bloomingdale Heights; but as the main action commenced on the plains near Manhattanville, it was called by Mr. Lossing the battle of Harlem Plains, and that title has been adopted in the subsequent narratives of Mr. Dawson and other writers.

The movements of the British left it doubtful what they might intend, and Washington's orders for the night of the 16th indicated careful preparation to meet a possible attack along the whole line of heights, commanding the hollow way from the North River to the main road leading from New York to Kingsbridge.



Local historians differ as to whether the battle was fought on the Bloomingdale Heights, or the Harlem Plains. Lossing gives it the name of the "battle on Harlem Plains," and describes it as taking place on the plains only. "Harlem Plains divided the hostile camps." The action, according to his description, swayed back and forth over the low, flat ground.

Dawson, in his *Battles of the United States by Sea and Land*, gives to it the name of the Battle of Harlem Plains, and describes it in the words of the chief authorities, but without defining the localities. Later, in 1868, in a paper read before the New York Historical Society, entitled the *Battle on Harlem Heights*, he established the various points and considered Bloomingdale Heights as the scene of the conflict. He divides the flanking movement into two parties, one of which he holds to have moved "to the eastward of the enemy by way of the Maretje Davit's Vly; the latter by way of the bank of the Hudson River to the westward of his position." This phraseology would be unintelligible but for the accompanying map (Valentine's Manual for 1868), which traces the second movement as a detour to the eastward from the Point of Rocks, which struck the British at the Hollow Way, at the foot of the northern extremity of Bloomingdale Heights. It is evident that Mr. Dawson considered the words Matje Davit's Vly to refer to the stream which ran through the meadows.

Mr. Jay considers that the attack by Leitch, which Adjutant-General Reed accompanied, was on the eastward of the Vandewater's Heights, and their route across the Harlem Plains.

Mr. Johnston, the latest of our local historians, in his "Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn," in the main follows Jay's description, differing from him, however, and Dawson as well, in his account of the flanking movement of the Americans, which he holds was by a *single* party, whose intention was to "march down (from the Point of Rocks) under cover of the bushes, cross the Kortwright farm unobserved, some little distance below the enemy, and reach the top of the Bloomingdale Ridge before they were discovered."

But while this difference of opinion exists as to the precise course of the fight, historians have hitherto agreed that its entire range was to the southward of Matje Davit's Fly, the position of which is precisely described by George Clinton, one of the Commissioners to settle the boundary line between the Corporation of New York and the Township of Harlem, November 23, 1774. He describes the line as "beginning at a bass wood stump, from whence grow several cyons, being on a certain

point on the east side of Hudson's River on the south side of the Bay, lying before a certain piece of meadow, commonly known by the name of the Round Meadow, or Mutje David's Fly." This was the Clinton to whom we owe the most perfect account of the movements of the troops and the distances, given with the accuracy of a surveyor. His letter (of 28th September) to his brother-in-law, Dr. Tappen (printed in the appendix), written a few days after the battle and less than two years after the survey, thus concisely defines the American position: "*Our Army, at least one division of it, lay at Colo. Morris's & so southward to near the Hollow Way, which runs across from Harlem Flats to the North River at Matje Davit's Fly.*"

It is difficult to understand by what process of reasoning or stretch of imagination the statements of authorities printed in the appendix, so plain and corroborative of each other, could be twisted into the account presented by Mr. Benedict in his address, and adopted by Mrs. Lamb, and the scene of battle shifted nearly two miles to the northward to support the new theory.

The following is the account of the battle from Mrs. Lamb's History of the City of New York (II., 133):

"Before daylight next morning Washington was in the saddle. His first important act was to send Knowlton with a picked company of one hundred and twenty men to learn the position of, and if practicable take the enemy's advanced guard. The second was to visit the various encampments 'to put matters in a proper situation,' should the British come on as expected. Knowlton from near headquarters descended the ravine, now Audubon's Park, leading his men along the low shore of the river to Matje Davit's Fly, and beyond into the woods that skirted the bank west of Vanderwater's Heights, until parallel with the left flank of the vanguard of the enemy under General Leslie. Here he was discovered at sunrise, and attacked by four hundred of the British light infantry; he allowed them to come within six rods before giving orders to fire, and after eight rounds apiece, he commanded a retreat, which decoyed the adversary, in the language of Sir Henry Clinton, 'into a scrape.' One of Knowlton's officers wrote: 'We retreated two miles and a half, and then made a stand, and sent for reinforcements, which we soon received, and drove the dogs near three miles.' There is no discrepancy between this statement and the report of De Heister, who said: 'They retired into their entrenchments to entice the pursuers deeper into the wood.'

"Confusion as to localities has resulted from the blending of two distinct encounters in the description of the battle of Harlem Heights. The first was at sunrise, occupying but a few minutes. The second commenced between ten and

eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and continued nearly four hours. It was the former to which Lewis Morris referred in writing to his father: 'Monday morning an advance party, Colonel Knowlton's regiment, was attacked by the enemy upon a heights a little to the southward of Dayes' Tavern;' and it was the second and chief battle which the pen-and-ink sketch furnished the Convention shortly afterward, and subsequently presented by John Sloss Hobart to Rev. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, describes as 'beginning near the Ten Mile Stone, and ending near the Eight Mile Stone.' Washington's headquarters at the Morris House was three and one-half miles from Howe's headquarters at the Apthorpe mansion. The army of each was thrown out in front for a mile and three-quarters, Washington's advanced guard under Greene being in the woods above, and his 'pickets' upon the 'Point of Rocks' which overlooked Manhattanville, while Howe's were upon Vanderwater's Heights opposite. During the interval between the two battles the light infantry of Leslie were silently pushing their way after Knowlton along the low shore of the Hudson.

"'As yet no fortifications had been erected across Harlem Heights,' wrote Silliman—and also George Clinton—'except a mere beginning near the Morris House, and three small redoubts about half way to Manhattanville.' From the first gray dawn he had a large force of men employed at this latter point with spades and shovels throwing earth into the trenches; ere nightfall lines were completed across the island, and subsequently strengthened. Washington galloped to Greene's encampment, where, seated upon his horse, at sunrise he heard the firing between Knowlton and Leslie, and saw large bodies of the enemy upon 'the high ground opposite.' He returned to the Morris House and hurriedly breakfasted. Uneasy about Knowlton, he sent scouts for information, when presently that handsome, animated young officer appeared in his presence, asking for reinforcements to capture his pursuers. Almost simultaneously one hundred of the British light infantry, who had clambered up the steep close in Knowlton's footsteps, came out upon the plain and blew their bugle-horns, as usual after a fox-chase. They had at the same time left three hundred men concealed in the woods on the river bank. Washington ordered Major Leitch with a detachment of Virginia riflemen to join Knowlton and his rangers, and with Reed as a guide, 'to steal' around to the rear of the foe by their right flank, while another detachment was to feign an attack in front. There was a hollow way or ravine, caused by a winding stream, between the two hostile parties, not far from the Ten Mile Stone, terminating at Audubon Park. The British upon the plain (some two hundred feet above the Hudson), seeing so few coming out to fight, ran jubilantly down the slope towards them, and took post behind a rail fence, firing briskly. As the Americans pushed forward, they left the fence, retiring up the hill. The rattle of musketry soon brought their reserve corps to the rescue; and just then, by some mistake or failure to obey orders to the letter, never satisfactorily explained, the spirited charge of the rangers and riflemen began upon the flank of the enemy, instead of the rear, as intended.

Both Knowlton and Leitch fell within ten minutes near each other, and within a few paces of Reed, whose horse was shot from under him. But the tide was turning, and the British giving way in an open field conflict. Washington reinforced his gallant soldiers with detachments from the nearest regiments, Griffiths', Richardson's, Nixon's, Douglass's and others, and the very men who had been so severely criticised for running from Kip's Bay the day before, redeemed themselves from the odium by deeds of noble daring. Putnam, Reed, and other prominent officers took command, charging upon the British and driving them from the plain; they fled through a piece of woods, becoming scattered and fighting from behind trees and bushes, and then into a buckwheat field. By this time it was nearly noon.

"The British officers, meanwhile, were on the alert and troops were forwarded on the trail of Leslie, whose disappearance in the early morning with his light infantry had caused no little solicitude. At the sound of guns on the Harlem Heights, Howe sent other reinforcements of Highlanders and Hessians on the double-quick to their relief. An Englishman wrote: 'At eleven we were instantly trotted about three miles (without a halt to draw breath) to support a battalion of light infantry, which had imprudently advanced so far without support as to be in great danger of being cut off.' One thousand of the reinforcing troops encountered Greene's two brigades, a sharp fight ensuing not far from his encampments; others proceeded further north on the low shore before mounting the heights, and joined their comrades in the buckwheat field just as the sun crossed the meridian. Through more succors from each party 'the battle was here maintained for nearly two hours with an obstinacy rarely equaled in the history of modern warfare.' The enemy finally 'broke and run,' and was driven and chased (the Americans mocking their bugles) 'above a mile and a half,' wrote Reed, 'nearly two miles,' wrote Knox, taking shelter in an orchard finally near the eight-mile stone, when Washington prudently sent Tilghman to order the victorious soldiers back to the lines. Thomas Jones, known as 'the fighting Quaker of Lafayette's army,' said: 'We drove the British up the road and down Break Neck Hill, which was the reason they call it Break Neck Hill.' \* \* \* The battle raged from about One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Street nearly to Manhattanville. \* \* \* At evening the armies occupied the same relative positions as before the battle, the British upon Bloomingdale (or, as more generally called, Vanderwater's) Heights, and the Americans upon Harlem Heights, their pickets almost within speaking distance ('three hundred yards') of each other across the Manhattanville valley. And thus they remained for upwards of three weeks."

Before entering upon an examination of this account in detail, its general statements may be first disposed of. It is asserted that "confusion in localities has resulted from the blending of two distinct encounters in the descriptions of the battle of Harlem Heights." We


are at loss to find any such blending of two distinct encounters in the accounts of the battle (the description of Mr. Dawson and the oration of Mr. Jay) which have treated of the localities with any precision. They agree in the view that the first encounter was that of Knowlton with his scouting party with the British advance guard at an early hour in the morning, and the second the engagement brought on by the orders of Washington.

The further statement that "this battle, the most brilliant and important in historical results of any fought during the whole war, was evidently a part of the British plan to drive the Americans from the island before they should have time to construct defences, and that the blunder of Leslie in beginning the battle too soon, and in the wrong place, occasioned the succession of British failures, which furnished the Americans food for self-confidence until peace was proclaimed," has no basis in contemporaneous authority.

Washington says, in his despatch to Congress of the 18th, that "the enemy appeared in several large bodies on the plains," and in his letter of the 23d, to the New York State Convention, "that several parties of the enemy appeared on the high grounds opposite to our heights." The latter is a better informed and no doubt correct statement. He does not speak of having been personally a witness to either appearance. There is no direct evidence to any appearance of large bodies anywhere; Adjutant-General Reed says, that "the account was brought up that the enemy was advancing in three columns," but that he, on going down to see "the truth of it, fell in with the above (Knowlton's) party." The letter of Howe to Lord George Germaine makes no mention of any plan of general engagement, and his disapproval, in general orders the next day, of "the conduct of the light company in pursuing the rebels without proper discretion and without support," is presumptive evidence that no general movement was contemplated, and further corroboration of this view is found in the statement of the Lieutenant of the Fifth Foot, that "his regiment was trotted out about three miles to support a battalion of light infantry, which had imprudently advanced so far without support as to be in great danger of being cut off."

To return to Mrs. Lamb's description. She says: "Before daylight Washington was in the saddle"—an assertion for which there is no warrant. On the contrary, the presumptive evidence is conclusive that he was in the early morning engaged in his correspondence. His letter of the 16th to the President of Congress was written early in the morning, before he knew of any encounter. His letter of the 18th, also to the





NEW YORK ISLAND, FROM MCGOWAN'S PASS TO THE ROGER MORRIS HOUSE.

President of Congress, and giving an account of the affair of the 16th, says that it was "about the time of the post's departure" that the rumor of the appearance of the enemy was brought in. Reed, his Adjutant-General, in his letter of the 17th, confirms this, saying that it was after he had "sealed his letter and sent it away" that the account came in. It was on this news coming in that Washington says he "rode down to the advance post, to put matters in a proper situation should they (the British) attempt to come on."

Mrs. Lamb asserts that "his (Washington's) first important act was to send Knowlton with a picked company of one hundred and twenty men to learn the position of and, if practicable, take the enemy's advance guard." For this, also, there is no authority. Washington's words of the morning of the 16th are: "I have sent out some reconnoitring parties to gain intelligence, if possible, of the disposition of the enemy." The fair inference is that these parties had their instructions the evening before, and moved from the advance posts of the army. Nor, it must be observed, does he speak of any attempt to surprise the enemy's outpost. The only authority for this statement is the anonymous letter of "an officer of our army," who says: "On Monday morning the General ordered us to go and take the enemy's advance guard. Accordingly, we set out just before day"—but this letter unsupported is not sufficient to authorize the statement that Knowlton received his orders from Washington in person, or that the party started from headquarters, or to warrant the assertion that it was the intention of the Commander-in-chief that the reconnoitring party should attempt to cut off the enemy's advance guard. This intention was only developed in the mind of Washington after he had ridden down to the outposts and "reconnoitred the situation," when, to use his own words, "he formed the design of cutting off such of them as had or might advance to the extremity of the wood."

Mrs. Lamb asserts that "Knowlton, from near Headquarters, descended the ravine, now Audubon Park (153d to 158th Streets), leading his men along the low shore of the river to Matje Davit's Fly, and beyond, into the woods which skirted the west bank of Vandewater's Heights, until parallel with the left flank of the vanguard of the enemy under General Leslie. Here he was discovered at sunrise, and attacked by four hundred of the British light infantry." This statement is not supported by any shadow of authority, but without it the new theory of the locality of the action is untenable. Here is the pivotal error in the entire description.

Sir William Howe says that the enemy "passed, under cover of the woods, near to the advanced posts of the army, by the way of Vandewater's Heights." The natural inference is, that the march was along these heights, and this view is confirmed by Howe's statement of the British position and by the maps of the period, which lay down the "advanced post" a short distance in front of the line from McGowan's Pass to the North River. The Vandewater Heights were no doubt the scene of the skirmish of the scouting party.

But there is positive evidence as to the precise place and time where the battle began. Morris, in his letter of the 18th, says that the advanced party of Colonel Knowlton's rangers was attacked by the enemy on a height a little to the southwest of Dayes' Tavern, and after opposing them bravely, and being overpowered by their numbers, they were forced to retreat, and the enemy advanced to the top of the hill, which was opposite to that which lies before Dayes' door.

General George Clinton, on the 18th, says, Knowlton was attacked "by a party of the enemy about ten o'clock, at Matje Davit's Fly," and on the 21st reiterated his words.

Morris refers to the skirmish along the crest of the Vandewater Heights, and Clinton, to the descent of the British from the hill upon the retreating party, who had fallen back within the American front, which stretched from the North River to the Kingsbridge Road.

The confusion as to localities which Mrs. Lamb charges upon her predecessors only occurs in her own narrative, and the source of it seems to be a misconception of the diary of the Rev. Dr. Stiles. His entry in this document was made October 18th from a conversation with Mr. Hobart, of the New York Convention, who had received the account from General Clinton. Why she should rely upon the statement of a third party when not only the original letter of Clinton to the Convention, but a second and confirmatory letter three days after to Dr. Tappan, his brother-in-law, was under her hand, does not appear, unless it be that the rough diagram of the ground given by Hobart in explanation serves to bear out the new view which she has adopted. Nor yet has she any authority for stating that this pen and ink, or any other sketch, was furnished to the Convention of New York, or that Clinton had any hand in its draft; on the contrary, it is the hasty work of a moment, and not such a drawing as an engineer like Clinton would send to a public body. It is reproduced in the appendix to Mr. Jay's address. The draft is easily intelligible: Washington is represented as stationed during the action at the Point of Rocks, and the

scene of action to the southward. The spot is indicated by the outline of a small blockhouse. As it is marked "G. Washington's Station," it appears that Mrs. Lamb considers it to be the Morris House headquarters, and supports her view from the erroneous location of the mile stones.

Mrs. Lamb asserts that "Washington galloped to Greene's encampment, where, seated upon his horse at sunrise, he heard the firing between Knowlton and Leslie, and saw large bodies of men upon the 'high ground opposite.' He returned to the Morris House and hurriedly breakfasted." The statement that he heard the firing at sunrise, and rode down to the advance posts, has already been disposed of. But, to carry out the novel theory, the author is compelled to take Washington back to a hurried breakfast at Headquarters, a mile and three-quarters in the rear of where his troops were engaged.

Arrived here we are informed that "uneasy about Knowlton, he sent scouts for information, when that handsome, animated young officer appeared in his presence, asking for reinforcements to capture his pursuers."

There is no evidence that Washington was uneasy about Knowlton, that he sent out scouts for information, or that he even saw Knowlton on that day until his body was brought in. Reed expressly states that it was he himself who had been with the advanced party, who obtained the order for reinforcements from Washington.

But these statements are necessary to support the theory which immediately follows, that, almost simultaneously, "one hundred of the British light infantry, who had clambered up the steep close in Knowlton's footsteps, came out upon the plain and blew their bugle horns as usual after a fox chase."

This is a strange interpretation of Reed's letter, in which the allusion to the contemptuous blast of the British bugles is found. Reed says in one letter that "he came off to the General." In the other, that "he went over to him" (the General), and by the time he got to him "the enemy appeared in open view." These allusions are evidently to the Vandewater Heights, the Hollow Way, and the Point of Rocks opposite. Are Mr. Benedict, and Mrs. Lamb whom he has led into this topographical and historical error, aware that this adventurous British party, which, in their idea had reached the lawn in front of the Roger Morris house, must have been nearly a mile in the rear of the lines which Silliman's brigade was then extending from river to river? To carry out this theory "a hollow way or ravine crossed by a winding stream between the two hostile parties," is discovered and fixed upon as the way by

which Knowlton and Leitch were to reach the flank and rear of the enemy. How Generals Clinton and Greene were occupying themselves at their post, "upon the heights commanding the hollow way from the North River to the main road leading from New York to Kingsbridge"—the Hollow Way which, according to George Clinton, "runs across from Harlem Flats to the North River at Matje Davit's Fly"—that the enemy could pass through their lines or turn their flank unobserved, does not appear.

Equally unauthorized and without basis in any known documents, is the statement that the adventurous Britishers were finally, after chasing Knowlton up the wood on the bank of the river, "climbing to the plain two hundred feet above the Hudson," and being supported by reinforcements, including "five or six thousand of their choicest (British) troops . . . with seven field pieces," maintained a fight of some hours, crossed the entire range of the Hudson height, and were finally driven "up the road and down Break-Neck Hill."

We are not told how these seven field pieces were transported along the river bank, where there was no road, up the wooded heights, with their rough, rocky, and almost inaccessible sides, as they are correctly described, or how they were brought off after the action.

Nor yet are we informed how Silliman, posted "half way between the Morris House and Manhattanville," according to the account under review, and who "from the first gray dawn had a large force of men employed at this latter point with spades and shovels, *throwing earth into the trenches*" until nightfall, when the works were completed across the island, could comfortably carry on this work with a battle raging in his rear.

Nor yet is it correct to say that Break-Neck Hill took its name from the British retreat, although the author claims it as "an important link in the chain of evidence which locates the battle." This statement is said to have been made to Mr. Benedict by one Jones, on the authority of his father, Thomas Jones. Our best local authority, Colonel Thomas F. Devoe, sets at rest this story, and shows that the name originated in the accident that occurred to the Northern Coach in June, 1795, when two persons were thrown from it and killed on the spot.

In a note to the text, an objection is made to the occurrence of the battle south of Manhattanville, on the ground that "had the battle occurred south of Manhattanville, and the enemy been driven a mile and a half, the Americans would have been in the vicinity of the Aphorpe Mansion." This is correct, and there is authority that they were not far



from it in the pursuit. A passage in a letter from a soldier, preserved in Stiles' Diary, says: "We followed them and we won the ground—*drove them till they brought their ships to bear upon us*, and the grapeshot flew thick enough." The ships, according to Washington's letter of the 16th, were "as high as Bloomingdale," covering the British left.

Finally, the statement that "at evening the armies occupied the same relative position as before the battle, the British upon Bloomingdale (or, as more generally called, Vandewater's) Heights, their pickets almost within speaking-distance ('three hundred yards') of each other, across the Manhattanville valley, where they remained for upward of three weeks," is also erroneous.


A glance at Sauthier's Map, surveyed in November, 1776, about two months after the action, published by Faden in 1777, shows that the Americans had their barracks at this period, and, as noted on the key, "until they burned them upon the movement of the King's army to Frog's Point in October," not only on the Vandewater Heights half way down to the British quarters, but on the main road through the Plains close down to McGowan's Pass, and on the eastern road to Harlem under the shadow of Snake Hill, which confirms the account of the gathering of the grain on the Plains by the American army in October. It is clear that the entire range of ground both hill and plain, between the Hollow Way and McGowan's Pass, was at no time held by the British until the American lines were forced on the 16th November, 1776, and Fort Washington fell.

If any further proof of the place of the action be necessary, it may be found in the precise location of the fight upon the map of the campaign of 1776, which accompanies the History of the Civil War in America by an officer of the Army (Captain Hall, of the 46th Regiment), published in London in 1780.

Captain Hall describes the action as beginning in front of the British left flank at Bloomingdale, and the two crossed swords which indicate the position of the fight on the map are placed just below the line of the road which crosses from the Bloomingdale road over Bloomingdale or Vandewater Heights, and through the Harlem Plain to the Kingsbridge post road. An additional indication by the letter F at the same place allows of no uncertainty concerning the meaning of the author; the printed "explanation" reading, "F, Skirmish on Vandewater's Heights between the British Light Infantry, the 42d Regiment, Hessian Company of Chasseurs, and the Rebels, the latter obliged to retire within their works with loss the 16th September."

This perfectly supports the correctness of Mr. Jay's localities, and is conclusive evidence against the novel theory advanced by Mr. Benedict and Mrs. Lamb.

The road here mentioned is that by which Washington directed Heath, in his letter of August 22, 1776, to send out a party to observe the movement of the British vessels on the North River. "There is a road out of the Harlem flatlands that leads up to the hills and continues



**F,** Skirmish on Vandewater's Heights between the Light Infantry, the 42d Regiment, Hessian Company of Chasseurs and the Rebels, the latter obliged to retire within their works with loss, the 16th September.

down the North River by Bloomingdale Delancy's, and which road I would have them march, as they will keep the river in sight, and pass a tolerable landing-place for troops in the neighborhood of Bloomingdale. This detachment should bring a couple of light field pieces." It will be here noticed, in the appendix to this article, that General Greene, writing to Washington of the movement of the troops on the 22d of October, expressly designates the place where the "Monday action," as the fight



## PLAN OF THE


### Battle of Trenton,

Fought the 24th of Dec., 1776,

Between the American troops under the command of Gen. Washington and three Hessian Regiments under the command of Col. Rall, when the latter surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

- A. Picket of an officer and 25 men.
- B. Company of Altenboun, of the Regiment of Losberg.
- D. Picket of a Captain, 1 Lieutenant and 75 Hessians.
- E. Detachment of an officer and 30 Hessians retreating on Burlington.
- F. Detachment of an officer and 30 Chasseurs.
- G. Places where the regiments formed.
- H. Place where the Hessians formed a line.
- I. Attack of two regiments of Losberg and Rall while Knyphausen covered the left flank.
- K. Place where Losberg and Rall surrendered.
- L. Place where Knyphausen surrendered.
- M. Losberg's guns stuck in the marsh.
- N. Knyphausen's guns.
- O. Rall's guns dismounted on the field.
- P. Attack of the Picket A and the Company B.
- Q. Brigade of Gen. Sullivan.
- R. Brigade of Gen. Mercer.
- S. Brigade of Gen. Stephen.
- T. Brigade of Lord Sterling.
- U. Brigade of Gen. Greene.
- V. Place from which Gen. Washington observed the entire movement and gave his orders.
- W. American Artillery.
- X. Last attack of Knyphausen and Losberg.

Translated.



of the 16th was known in the army as on the hill. It will not be pretended that the British troops were on the 22d of October in the neighborhood of Audubon Park and the Morris House.

Mr. Jay's account of the Battle of Harlem Plains is amply supported both by tradition and documents. It is in entire accord with the contemporaneous authority carefully collected by Mr. William Kelby for the New York Historical Society, and printed by it as an appendix to Jay's address, and is now still further corroborated by the additional testimony which has been kindly contributed by this thorough and painstaking investigator of New York history.

JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS

\* The Battle of Harlem Plains. Oration before the New York Historical Society, September 16, 1876, by John Jay. Published by the Society. New York. 1876.

## APPENDIX

*General Washington to the President of Congress, Headquarters, at Colonel Roger Morris's House, 18 September, 1776.*

\* \* About the time of the post's departure with my letter (of the 16th), the enemy appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, about two and a half miles from hence. I rode down to our advanced posts, to put matters in a proper situation, if they should attempt to come on. When I arrived there I heard a firing, which, I was informed, was between a party of our Rangers under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton, and an advanced party of the enemy. Our men came in and told me, that the body of the enemy, who kept themselves concealed, consisted of about three hundred, as near as they could guess. I immediately ordered three companies of Colonel Weedon's regiment from Virginia, under the command of Major Leitch, and Colonel Knowlton with his Rangers, composed of volunteers from different New England regiments, to try to get in their rear, while a disposition was making as if to attack them in front, and thereby draw their whole attention that way.

This took effect as I wished on the part of the enemy. On the appearance of our party in front, they immediately ran down the hill, and took possession of some fences and bushes, and

a smart firing began, but at too great a distance to do much execution on either side. The parties under Colonel Knowlton and Major Leitch unluckily began their attack too soon, as it was rather in flank than in rear. In a little time Major Leitch was brought off wounded, having received three balls through his side; and, in a short time after, Colonel Knowlton got a wound, which proved mortal. Their men however persevered, and continued the engagement with the greatest resolution. Finding that they wanted a support, I advanced part of Colonel Griffith's and Colonel Richardson's Maryland regiments, with some detachments from the Eastern regiments who were nearest the place of action. These troops charged the enemy with great intrepidity, and drove them from the wood into the plain, and were pushing them from thence, having silenced their fire in a great measure, when I judged it prudent to order a retreat, fearing the enemy, as I have since found was really the case, were sending a large body to support their party.

*Gen. Washington to the N. Y. State Convention. Headquarters, at the Heights of Harlem, September 23, 1776.*

On Monday morning last, several parties of the enemy appeared on the high grounds opposite

to our heights, and some skirmishing had happened between our troops and those of the enemy. On reconnoitring their situation, I formed the design of cutting off such of them as had or might advance to the extremity of the wood.

*Gen. Washington to Patrick Henry. Headquarters, Heights of Harlem, Oct. 5, 1776.*

I formed a design of cutting off some of the enemy's light troops, who, encouraged by their success, had advanced to the extremity of the high ground opposite to our present encampment.

*Adj. Gen. Joseph Reed to his wife. Heights near Kingsbridge, Sept. 17, 1776.*

Just after I had sealed my Letter & sent it away, an Acct. came that the Enemy were advancing upon us in three large Columns—we have so many false Reports that I desired the General to permit me to go & discover what Truth there was in the Acct. I accordingly went down to our most advanced Guard & while I was talking with the Officer, the Enemy's advanced Guard fired upon us at a small Distance, our men behaved well stood & return'd the Fire till overpowered by numbers they were obliged to retreat—the Enemy advanced upon us very fast I had not quitted a House 5 minutes before they were in Possession of it—Finding how things were going I went over to the General to get some support for the brave Fellows who had behaved so well—by the Time I got to him the Enemy appeared in open view & in the most insulting manner sounded their Bugle Horns as is usual after a Fox Chase. I never felt such a sensation before it seem'd to crown our Disgrace. The General was prevailed on to order over a Party to attack them & as I had been upon the Ground which no one else had it fell to me to conduct them—an unhappy Movement was made by a Regt. of ours which had been ordered to amuse them while those I was with expected to take them in the Rear—but being diverted by this the Virginia Regimt. with which I was went another course finding there was no stopping them I went with them the new Way—and in a few Minutes our brave Fellows mounted up the Rocks & attacked them then they ran in Turn.

*Gen. George Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Kings Bridge, Sept. 18, 1776.*

Our Army for some Days has been moving upwards this way, and encamping on the Heights, sou-west of Coll. Morris's, where we intended to form Lines, and make our grand stand.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Enemy landed the main Body of their Army, took Possession of the City, & marched up the Island, & encamped on the Heights extending from McGowan's and the Black Horse to the North River.

On Monday morning, about ten o'clock, a party of the Enemy, consisting of Highlanders, Hessians, the Light Infantry, Grenadiers, and English Troops (Number uncertain) attack'd our advanc'd Party, commanded by Col. Knowlton at Martje Davits Fly. They were opposed with spirit, and soon made to retreat to a clear Field, southwest of that about 200 paces, where they lodged themselves behind a Fence covered with Bushes our People attacked them in Turn, and caused them to retreat a second Time, leaving five dead on the Spot, we pursued them to a Buckwheat Field on the Top of a high Hill, distance about four hundred paces, where they received a considerable Reinforcement, with several Field Pieces, and there made a Stand a very brisk Action ensued at this Place, which continued about Two Hours our People at length worsted them a third Time, caused them to fall back into an Orchard, from thence across a Hollow, and up another Hill not far distant from their own lines—A large Column of the Enemy's Army being at this Time discovered to be in motion, and the Ground we then occupied being rather disadvantageous a Retreat likewise, without bringing on a general Action, (which we did not think prudent to risk,) rather insecure, our party was therefore ordered in, and the Enemy was well contented to hold the last Ground we drove them to.

\* \* \* \* \*

Since the above affair, nothing material has happened the Enemy keep close to their Lines. Our advanc'd Parties continue at their former station.



*Gen. George Clinton to Dr. Peter Tappen. King's Bridge, 21st Sept., 1776.*

The same Day the Enemy possessed themselves of the City, to wit, last Sunday they landed the Main Body of their Army & encamped on York Island across about the Eight Mile Stone & between that & the four Mile Stone. Our Army at least one Division of it lay at Colo. Morris's & so southward to near the Hollow Way which runs across from Harlem Flat to the North River at Matje Davit's Fly. About halfway between which two Places our Lines run across the River which indeed at that Time were only began but are now in a very defensible state. On Monday Morning the Enemy attacked our Advanced Party Commanded by Colo. Knowlton (a brave Officer who was killed in the Action) near the Point of Matje Davit's Fly the Fire was very brisk on both sides our People however soon drove them back into a Clear Field about 200 Paces South East of that where they lodged themselves behind a Fence covered with Bushes our People pursued them but being obliged to stand exposed in the open Field or take a Fence at a Considerable Distance they preferred the Latter it was indeed adviseable for we soon brought a Couple of Field Pieces to bear upon them which fairly put them to Flight with two Discharges only the Second Time our People pursued them closely to the Top of a Hill about 400 paces distant where they received a very Considerable Reinforcement & made their Second Stand Our People also had received a Considerable Reinforcement, and at this Place a very brisk Action commenced which continued for near two Hours in which Time we drove the Enemy into a Neighbouring orchard from that across a Hollow & up another Hill not far Distant from their own Encampment, here we found the Ground rather Disadvantageous & a Retreat insecure we therefore thought proper not to pursue them any farther & retired to our first Ground leaving the Enemy on the last Ground we drove them to—that Night I commanded the Right Wing of our advanced Party or Picket on the Ground the Action first began of which Colo. Pawling & Colo. Nicoll's Regiment were part and next Day I sent a Party to bury our Dead.

*Lewis Morris, Jr., to his Father. Headquarters, Septbr 18th, 1776.*

Monday morning an advanced party, Colonel Knowlton's regiment, was attacked by the enemy upon a height a little to the southwest of Day's Tavern, and after opposing them bravely and being overpowered by their numbers they were forced to retreat, and the enemy advanced upon the top of the hill opposite to that which lies before Dayes's door, with a confidence of Success, and after rallying their men by a bugle horn and resting themselves a little while, they descended the hill with an intention to force our flanking party, which extended from the North river to the before mentioned hill, but they received so warm a fusillade from that flank and a party that went up the hill to flank them and cut off their retreat, that they were forced to give way.

*Col. G. S. Silliman to his wife. Harlem Heights, 17 Sept., 1776, 2 o'clock P. M.*

Yesterday at 7 o'clock in the morning we were alarmed with the sight of a considerable number of the enemy on the Plains below us about a mile distant.—Our Brigades which form a line across the Island where I am were immediately ordered under arms—but as the enemy did not immediately advance we grounded our arms & took spades & shovels & went to work & before night had thrown up lines across the Island—There was nothing before but three little redoubts in about a mile & we are at work this day in strengthening them. But yesterday a little before noon we heard a strong firing about half a mile below us in the woods near where we had two Brigades lying as an advanced guard. The enemy in a large body advanced in the woods a little before 12 o'clock & began a heavy fire on those two Brigades who maintained the fire obstinately for some time & then they were reinforced by several regiments & the fire continued very heavy from the musketry & from field pieces about two hours—in which time our people drove the regulars back from post to post about a mile & a half & then left them pretty well satisfied with their dinner.

*Major Nicholas Fish to John McKesson, Secretary N. Y. Convention. Kingsbridge, 19th Sept., 1776.*

We are now in possession of the ground for-

the Heights of Harlem to the Heights of West Chester, our advance Guard is posted a Mile from our Lines; here it was that our brave and heroic Marylanders, Virginians, &c. made a Noble & resolute stand against the Efforts of the Enemy on Monday the 16th drove them back, pursued and forced them to retire.

*John Gooch to Thomas Fayerweather. New Jersey, Fort Constitution, Sept. 23, 1776.*

On the 15th Inst we evacuated New York & took all stores of every kind out of the City, and took Possession of the hights of Haerlem eight miles from the City, the Enemy encamp'd about two miles from us; on the 16th the Enemy advanced and took Possession of a hight on our Right Flank abt half a mile Distance.

*Samuel Chase to Gen. Gates. Philadelphia, September 21, 1776.*

Our army retreated, and possessed themselves of the Heights of Harlem; our Headquarters at Roger Morris's house. On Monday last the Enemy appeared in the plains, 2½ Miles from the Heights, about 400 under General Leslie. A Skirmish began between them and a Party of Volunteers from several New England regiments commanded by Colo. Knolton. our People were supported by Companies from a Virginia Battalion and from two Militia Maryland Regiments. The Enemy were obliged to retreat with the Loss of about 100 killed and prisoners—Colo. Knolton, a brave officer, was killed. Major Leitch of May'd was wounded and despaired of. The Enemies main Army is now encamped between 7 and 8 Miles Stones General Howe's Head Quarters at one Mr Apthorp's.

*From Gen. Heath's Memoirs. Sept. 16th, 1776.*

A little before noon, a smart skirmish happened on the heights west of Haerlem Plain, and south of Morris's house, between a party of Hessian Yagers British Light-Infantry and Highlanders, and the American riflemen and some other troops, which ended in favour of the latter.

*Sir William Howe to Lord Germaine. Headquarters, York Island, Sept. 21, 1776.*

The position the King's army took, on the 15th in the evening, was with the right to Horen's Hook, and the left at the North River near to Bloomingdale.

On the 16th in the morning a large party of

the enemy having passed under cover of the woods near to the advanced posts of the army by way of Vanderwater's Height, obliged them to retire.

*American General Orders. Headquarters, 16th September, 1776.*

The arrangement for this Night upon the heights commanding the hollow way from the North River to the Main Road leading from New York to Kingsbridge. Gen. Clinton to form next to the North River, and extend to the left. Gen. Scott's Brigade next to Gen. Clinton's.

*Extract of a Letter from Harlem, Oct. 3, 1776.*

"Yesterday morning eleven hundred men were ordered to parade at daylight, to bring off the corn, hay &c which lay on Harlem plains between the enemy and us. This property has lain for a fortnight past unmolested, both sides looking at it, and laying claim to it until to day, when it was brought off by us. A covering party were within musket shot of the enemy, but they made no other movements than to man their lines; and three thousand of our men appearing struck their tents, expecting an attack. Our fatigue party finished the business, and not a single shot was fired. These plains would afford an excellent field for a fight. I really expected an action, but the enemy declined it."

*William Ellery to Gov. Cooke of R. I. Phil., Oct. 11, 1776.*

General Washington, as I am told, played off a pretty manœuvre the other day. Determined to remove the grain and the furniture of the houses from Harlem, he drew out into the field a party of seventeen hundred. The enemy turned out as many. They approached within three hundred yards and looked at each other. While they were thus opposed front to front, our wagons carried off the grain and furniture. When this was accomplished, both parties retired within their lines.

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FROM PRINTED SOURCES  
NOT IN JAY'S ADDRESS.

*Extract from a letter of Lieut. Tench Tilghman to his Father. Headquarters, Colo. Morris's, 19 September, 1776.*

\* \* \* On Monday last we had a pretty sharp skirmish with the British Troops, which

was brought on in the following manner. The General rode down to our furthest Lines, and when he came near them heard a firing, which he was informed was between our Scouts and the out Guards of the Enemy. When our men came in they informed the General that there were a party of about 300 behind a woody hill, tho' they showed a very small party to us. Upon this the General laid a plan for attacking them in the Rear and cutting their Retreats, which was to be effected in the following manner. Major Leitch, with three companies of Colo. Weedon's Virginia Regiment, and Colo. Knowlton with his Rangers, were to steal round, while a party were to march towards them and seem as if they intended to attack in front, but not to make any real attack till they saw our men fairly in their Rear. The Bait took as to one part; as soon as they saw our party in front, the Enemy ran down the Hill and took possession of some Fences and Bushes, and began to fire at them, but at too great distance to do much execution. Unluckily Colo. Knowlton and Major Leitch began their attack too soon; it was rather in Flank than in Rear. The Action now grew warm; Major Leitch was wounded early in the Engagement, and Colo. Knowlton soon after, the latter mortally; he was one of the bravest and best officers in the Army. Their men notwithstanding persisted with the greatest Bravery. The Genl, finding they wanted support, ordered over part of Colo. Griffith's, and part of Colo. Richardson's Maryland Regiments; these Troops, tho' young, charged with as much Bravery as I can conceive; they gave two fires, and then rushed right forward, which drove the Enemy from the wood into a Buckwheat field, from which they retreated. The General fearing (as we afterwards found) that a large Body was coming up to support them, sent me over to bring our men off. They gave a Hurra and left the Field in good Order. We had about 40 wounded and a very few killed. A Sergeant who deserted says their Accounts were 89 wounded and 8 killed, but in the latter he is mistaken, for we have buried more than double that number—We find their force was much more considerable than we imagined when the General or-

dered the Attack. It consisted of the 2d Battn of light Infantry, a Battn of the Royal Highlanders and 3 comps of Hessian Rifle Men. The prisoners we took told us they expected our men would have run away, as they did the day before, but that they were never more surprised than to see us advancing to attack them. The Virginia and Maryland Troops bear the Palm. (Membir of Lieut.-Col. Tench Tilghman.)

*Extract from a letter of General John Glover to General Washington, Burdett's Ferry, Sept. 18, 1777.*

The enemy are forming an encampment on the edge of North River, about one mile below where the battle was fought on Monday last. (Upham's Memoir of General Glover.)

*Extracts from Proceedings of a General Court-Martial held on the Heights of Harlem, September 19 and 21, 1776.*

*Major Box.*—Last Tuesday (17th Sep.), about two o'clock, I saw a number of people plundering down on Harlem plain. Took a party and went down on the Plain, and met Ensign Macumber, with a party of upwards of twenty, all loaded with plunder, such as house furniture, table linen, and kitchen utensils, China and delf ware.

*John Petty* (in Prisoner's defence).—Just before we entered the town of Harlem Ensign Macumber stopped the party, and expressly ordered us out to plunder. I was posted as a sentry, and knew nothing of the party plundering. I was one who drove the Cattle off, and did not join the party who had the plunder.

*Captain Ramsay.*—Last Tuesday (17 Sept) in the beginning of the afternoon, I was crossing Harlem Plains; I saw a number of men loaded with plunder. (Force's Archives.)

*From the History of the Civil War in America, by an Officer in the Army (Captain Hall of the Forty-sixth Regiment). London, 1780.*

As the enemy evacuated the city on our first appearance of landing, a brigade took possession of it in the evening, and our army extended their encampments across the island, with their right to Moran's Hook and their left to Bloomingdale.

On the 16th, in the morning, a body of the enemy moved out of their lines on Morris' Heights, and appeared at a house near the edge of a wood, in front of our left flank, on which two companies of light infantry were sent to dislodge them. The enemy being drove to the wood, under cover of which they secretly acquired reinforcements and maintained their ground, the 2d battalion of light infantry and the 42d Highlanders were ordered to our support. The rebels, increased to four thousand men, would in all probability have surrounded the detachment in this intricate situation had not some other Corps been put in motion to sustain it. The enemy closely pressed, retired to the protection of their lines, avoiding a general action, which, from the position of affairs, seemed to be approaching.

The frigates which had been detached up the North River covered our left flank, whilst others took their station in the East River to secure our right. \* \* \*

*Extracts from Washington's General Orders.*

*Sept. 18.* Gen. Parsons', General Scott's and Sergeant's Brigades are to march over Kingsbridge, and take orders for encamping from Gen. Heath. Col. Shea's, Magaw's and Haslet's three Regiments, and the Regiment under Col. Broadhead are to return to Mount Washington, and to be under the immediate care of Gen. Mifflin. Col. Ward's regiment from Connecticut may for the present be advanced to the Brigade commanded by Col. Sergeant. Gen. Mifflin's, McDougall's, Heard's, Wadsworth's and Fellows' Brigades, and the Brigade commanded by Col. Silliman and Douglass, are to have each a Regiment in the Field this evening, by Mr. Kortright's house back of the lines, at 5 o'clock this afternoon, as a Piquet for the advanced Post, the whole to be under the command of Brig. Gen'l McDougall, who is to see that they are properly posted from the North River round to the encampment above the road.

*Sept. 19.* The Piquet Guards, which are to occupy the out post most advanced to the enemy, are to consist of 800 men; they are to be furnished by detachments from the several Brigades below Kingsbridge, and so every day till further orders.

*Sept. 21.* Gen. Putnam & Spencer, together with the several Brigadiers on this side Kingsbridge, are to look over the ground within our lines, and fix upon places to build barracks or houses for quartering the men in; no time should be lost in making the choice, that covering may be had as soon as possible for the ease and comfort of the men.

The Brigadier General and the Brigade Major of the day are both to attend the Parade at the hour of mounting guard, and see them brought on and marched off, and to continue near the advanced lines till they are relieved next day, in order that they may be ready in case of an attack to command at the lines.

*Sept. 26.* Upon any alarm or approach of the enemy towards our lines, Gen. Mifflin, with his brigade, are to possess our left flank, from the hollow way by Col. Sargent's late encampment to the point of rocks on the left front of our lines, and till the regiment commanded by Col. Weedon is brigaded to be joined by the same. Gen. McDougall's Brigade is to repair to the plain back of Gen. Mifflin, and be ready to support him or the piquet in the front, as occasion may require. Gen. Beal's brigade is to repair to the lines which cross the road by Col. Moyland's lodgings, and extend their right to the middle redoubt by Mr. Kortright's house, occupying the same. Gen. Wadsworth and Fellows are to take the remaining part of those lines, with the redoubt thereon on the North River. These three brigades to defend these lines, or wait there for orders. Gen. Heard is to parade, and be ready to march wherever ordered. Gen. Putnam is to command in front of the lines by Mr. Kortright's. Gen. Spencer in the rear of them.

*Oct. 3.* Gen. Putnam will please to point out proper places for huts to shelter the piquet guard in front of our lines, and direct the officers who command those guards to see that the men are employed every day at work thereon till they are completed, and this for the sake of their own health and convenience they will do as soon as possible, as the weather will soon grow too uncomfortable to stay without shelter.

*Oct. 8.* Commanding officer of the Rangers reports that soldiers continually straggle down to Harlem without arms—he is ordered to arrest

them—In order to distinguish the Rangers, they are to wear something white round their arms. Ammunition store established near Gen. Spencer's quarters. (Force's Archives.)

*Extracts from Proceedings of a General Court-Martial held on Harlem Heights, September 23, 1776.*

Lieutenant Stewart deposed: That he was on a scouting party on Tuesday, 17th of September, and met Captain Northrop [of Silliman's Regiment] with another party, of which the prisoner was one, and we agreed to endeavour taking the enemy's advanced guard. We were prevented doing it, but got down to a fence, where we exchanged some shot with the enemy. Both parties were together. In about ten minutes the prisoner and three or four others ran off to a fence a hundred yards—The prisoner had a large pewter dish under his arm; I ordered him to lay down his dish and go back or I would shoot him. I was so intent on the motions of the enemy that I did not observe him afterwards; it was immediately after a shot from the enemy that the prisoner run away.

Nathaniel Thomas confirms Lieutenant Stewart's deposition, and adds that the prisoner ran two hundred and fifty feet. \* \* \* (Force's Archives.)

*Colonel Graydon's Memoirs of his own time.*

While the main army remained at the heights of Harlem, a period of five weeks, from about the middle of September to the middle of October, we (Shea's and Magaw's Regiments) constituted a part of it, and did duty accordingly. It was my chance to be on guard on the night of the fire at New York (20–21 September) on the picket, advanced about a mile in front of our lines. For a considerable extent the heavens appeared to be in flames, and from the direction of the light, I could not doubt there was a conflagration in the city. I might have been distant from it about nine miles; and had not my situation been overlooked by a hill directly in front, the cause might perhaps have been distinctly developed.

*Gen. Alex. McDougall to Committee of Arrangement, Camp at Harlem, Oct. 17, 1776.*

Nothing material has happened here since the skirmish of the 16th ultimo. The enemy

appear very shy. Our advanced sentries and theirs are within three hundred yards of each other in Harlem lane. The works they have thrown up are evidently calculated for defense. (Force's Archives.)

*Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, Fort Lee, Oct. 29, 1776.*

The ships have fallen down the North River, and the troops which advanced upon Harlem Plains, and on the hill where the Monday action was, have drawn within their lines again. (Force's Archives.)

*At a Court-Martial held on Harlem Heights, Oct. 15, 1776,*

*John Bussing* testified: "My house is down by the 8 mile stone. The day after the army had retreated from York (Sept. 16) I left the house, and left most of our articles in the house." These articles were carried away by Pope's men, one of them,

*George Wilson* testified: "I was one of the party that went into Mr. Bussing's house; and it lying very near the enemy, and being deserted, we thought it best to take away what things we could, and save them for the owners."

*Captain Holmes* testified: "Lieut. Pope informed me that our sentries had drove off the enemy from Mr. Bussing's house, and that as there was a number of articles, Lieut. Pope proposed that a party should go and bring them off," which was accordingly done, and they were put under the quarter guard, and afterwards taken to headquarters.

George Wilson on being tried for the same crime confessed that he went with two or three others one night, about three weeks ago (Sept. 23), and took away several things. (Force's Archives.)

*Orders of Col. Magaw, who commanded at Harlem Heights and Fort Washington.*

*Nov. 1, 1776.*—Ninety men for Picquet towards New York to-morrow, to be selected as follows:

North River, 1 Sub and 20 men. Holloway, 1 Sergt and 10 men. Point of Rocks, 1 Sub and 20 men. Works near Harlem River, 1 Sub and 20 men. One Capt. at the Point of Rocks or North River. 1 Sub and 20 on the East River between Head Quarters and Fort Washington. (Mag. Am. Hist., I., 756.)

# DIARY OF A FRENCH OFFICER

1781

(Presumed to be that of Baron Cromot du Bourg.)

*From an unpublished Manuscript in the possession of C. Fiske Harris. of Providence, R. I.*

Translated for the Magazine of American History.

## III

## FROM KING'S FERRY TO HEAD OF ELK

*August 25*—The First Division or First Brigade, composed of the Bourbonnois and Deux Ponts left its camp for Suffern's. The road is very fine before reaching there. Hackensack is passed, quite a pretty village, leaving which an open country is found and a valley of extreme beauty of landscape. The fences here are made in the same manner as our barred fences in France (there are five bars one over the other), which gives an air of neatness and adds to the beauty of the spot.

*Side Note.*—The same day the Second division crossed the North River and took the camp we occupied the evening before.

March, 15 miles.

*August 26*—We went from Suffren's (Suffern's) to Pompton, four miles this side of which the river of this name is crossed three times and there are bridges at each passage; the first and third are fordable; the road is superb. This is an open and well cultivated country, inhabited by Dutch people who are almost all quite rich. We arrived in good season, and the camps being set and the troops arrived, I thought I could not do better than to go to Totowa to see a cataract

which is considered to be one of the most curious sights in this part of the country. I left at two o'clock to pay it a visit, although it was ten miles distant. The road to it is very fine; there are several large dwelling houses on the road, many cattle and a good quantity of fruit. I went as far as the village of Totowa, which is quite large and well built. I left my horses there and went up to the fall, which seemed to me more curious than beautiful. The river flows down quietly and all at once disappears within an immense rock which lies in the middle of its bed. This rock is split in two; the chasm at its widest part is from twelve to fifteen feet. This separation continues to diminish until it is almost imperceptible. The river falls from sixty to eighty feet through this split, and after it reaches the foot of the rock flows quietly, taking its direction to the left. This rock, which is quite large, has two other separations, which are narrower, but quite as deep, on the left of the cascade. I returned by the same road and reached the camp in quite good season.

*Side Note.*—March, 15 miles.

*August 27*—We marched to Whippany by a fine road. At four miles distance there is an extensive dwelling. Whippany is quite a large place; the river of the same name, which is fordable, passes through it.

*Side Note.*—March, 16 miles.

*August 28*—The First Division halted and the second joined it. M. de Rochambeau left us in the afternoon for Philadelphia. He took with him Messieurs de Fersen, de Vauban and de



Closen, but on his leaving I asked permission to join him in three days, which he gave me.

*August 29*—The First Brigade, under command of the Baron de Vioménil, marched from Bullions' Tavern; at five miles from Wepennay (Whippany) is Morristown, a very pretty town; it is situated on a little hill and in a very pleasant situation. It has sixty or eighty well-built houses.

The American Army encamped here in 1776. The position taken was behind the woods to the left of Wepennay (Whippany). General Sullivan was then at Chatham, seven miles to the left. General Lee was ordered to march from Morristown to Newtown, beyond the Delaware; after crossing the Pysayck (Passaic) by a very poor wooden bridge, there is a fork in the road. His army took the road to the right, which was the best. He and suite took that to the left. The enemy who occupied the neighborhood were soon informed of this blunder; they sent out some light troops through the woods which skirt the Baskenridge road and captured him the next morning while he was at breakfast, and his division, nine miles distant from him, was on its march. After crossing the bridge, a fine house, belonging to Lord Stirling, is passed. It is on the left, about two miles distant. In 1779 the American Army encamped on the heights between Morristown and the river; to be more precise, between the Mendem and Baskenridge roads. General Washington took this position to protect the Delaware, and perfectly succeeded, holding here the key of all the

roads. In 1780, the Pennsylvania, Jersey and Maryland lines all encamped on the high ground close to the river; General Wayne was in command. The Pennsylvania line revolted, but the trouble was appeased in a few days by dismissing all strangers whose term of service had expired, incorporating the rest of the Pennsylvanians in the Maryland and Jersey lines, and punishing with death all the instigators of the revolt. The road to Bullion's Tavern is fine and level; the troops arrived there early.

*Side Note.*—Judging from the direction of our march, there is reason to believe that we shall not make any attempt on New York, nor yet on Staten Island. The journey of the General to Philadelphia confirms me still more in this idea, and I am satisfied we are about to pay a visit to Cornwallis, who, it is said, is entrenched at Yorktown. The letters which M. de Rochambeau has received from Lafayette inform him that it is to this town that this General has retreated.

March, 16 miles.

*August 30*—We marched to Somerset Court House, the distance to which is only twelve miles, over a fine road.

*Side Note.*—March, 12 miles.

*August 31*—At four o'clock in the morning the Baron de Vioménil entrusted me with a letter to M. de Rochambeau, requesting me to deliver it to him at Philadelphia before dinner, if possible. I left Somerset immediately, and rode to Princetown through some very disagreeable woods, although the road itself was fine enough. This town is well built and pleasantly situated. There is a very fine college here. The place is famous for the success which the Americans had over the English

here in 1777. The 2d of January of this year General Washington made an extremely bold and well combined movement: he marched from Trenton at nightfall with his entire army, leaving all his camp fires burning in front of Lord Cornwallis, who had come to attack him there. He marched by the Allentown road, and was joined on the way by several bodies of militia. He arrived within a mile of Princetown at daylight, and found on the high road to his left a body of English in disorder, who, on perceiving him, countermarched to join the 7th Regiment, which was two miles distant towards the left of the town. General Washington moved his men by the double quick, and had the good fortune to strike the 7th Regiment before it could reach the main body of the English, which forced it to retreat, and finally to surrender near the college to the number of 250; the remainder escaped into the woods, and fell back on Lord Cornwallis to the north of Trenton. Meanwhile General Sullivan had taken a position on high ground in Kingstown, beyond Millstone river, where there was a bridge, which he destroyed after crossing. The object of General Washington in sending him there was to prevent any succor reaching the enemy from Brunswick. This succeeded completely. After a light fire, some runaways gathered before the bridge. General Washington advanced upon them, dispersed them, and continued his march towards Rocky Hill, whence he marched upon Somerset and the Pompton plains, where he took a position. Sullivan rejoined him after crossing the Millstone three miles below

on another bridge, which he also destroyed. Lord Cornwallis, informed of this affair, marched promptly to the succor of his troops, but arrived too late; he repaired the first bridge, and retreated to Brunswick. If the Americans had not been worn out by several forced marches, the intention of General Washington was to have pushed on to Brunswick and endeavor to defeat the rest.

While stopping at Princeton to rest my horses, I examined this position as thoroughly as I could. I then took again the road to Trenton, which is only twelve miles distant. This town is larger than the first, but not so pretty. It is like a large French (bourg) village. At the end of it is Trenton Creek, which is crossed by a bridge, and about half a mile beyond the Delaware, where there is a ferry. The town is interesting also because of two engagements in which General Washington was successful.

The first was on the 24th December, 1776. The enemy had established their winter quarters along the Delaware at Trenton, Bordentown, and above at Brunswick, Princeton, etc. The American army were in barracks at the time; some at Newtown and Hightown, beyond the Delaware above Trenton. On the night of the 24th December General Washington crossed his army on boats over the Delaware at Kenkis Ferry (McKonkey's), nine miles above Trenton; he formed it in two columns, took that of the right under his own orders, and gave the command of the left to General Sullivan. The *corps de reserve* followed the latter. The troops came at point of day upon the

different pickets which the Hessians had on the road which ended in the town. At the first alarm the greater number of them threw themselves into the church, which is nearly in the middle of the town, and defended themselves for some time against the right column, which debouched by the St. Clair road, which skirts the river; they had even lost a great many men before Colonel Roll (Rahl), who commanded them, decided to form them on a little eminence near by. General Washington then deployed his column before Trenton on their left flank, while Sullivan formed his line of battle in their front, and the *corps de reserve* filed through the little ravines to turn their right. Colonel Rahl, finding himself surrounded, surrendered with one thousand men; nearly four hundred had before gotten over the bridge of the creek below Trenton, and reached the encampment at Bordentown.

The second affair occurred six days later. General Washington crossed the river again, and took a position below the creek, which flows to the south of Trenton, along which there is, at a distance of about three miles, an impassable marsh which extends to the woods. Lord Cornwallis marched at once with all his force to attack him there, and only left a reserve corps of two regiments at Princeton to hold the communication with Brunswick, Amboy, etc. In order to arrest or at least to delay the march of the enemy, General Washington sent skirmishers into the woods, who destroyed a bridge over the creek which I have just mentioned, and by this means compelled the English to look for other passages, which they defended foot by

foot. Besides this, two American battalions took possession of a little eminence in front of Trenton, beyond the creek, with a piece of cannon. The skirmishers being driven back after a vigorous resistance, Lord Cornwallis marched his troops by his right to turn the two battalions, which, after two discharges, recrossed the bridge and rejoined their army. The English general then deployed his troops on the little slope in front of the creek, and placed some batteries to dismount the American pieces posted in the ravine on the other side of the same creek, near a mill which is on the left of the bridge. General Washington threw up a redoubt to protect his left, where the creek was easy of passage. Lord Cornwallis marched a column to turn it on this side, but it was soon forced to withdraw. The cannonade continued until nightfall. The troops remained opposite to each other, and it was from this point that Washington marched the same evening to Princeton, on the expedition which I have already mentioned. It is to be noticed that during these different actions the American army was not over 4,000 men, while that of the English reached 10,000.

After stopping about two hours at Trenton, I crossed the Delaware, and continued my route over a flat and pleasant country, over which were scattered very pretty woods and pieces of well cultivated land. At about eight miles' distance the same river is met with again, and the road runs along its bank to Bristol, a little before reaching which Burlington is seen on the opposite bank. This is quite a considerable place, and presents a lovely landscape. Bristol is

then reached, which, although only consisting of forty or fifty houses, is quite pretty. After Bristol the Shammana River is crossed in a ferry-boat. This little river empties near there in the Delaware. From this point it is only seventeen miles to Philadelphia; the road is fine, level and quite broad, and passes by many little villages and pleasant country houses. I arrived at three o'clock at the house of M. de la Luzerne, the Minister of France, where M. de Rochambeau was living, and delivered my letter. My haste cost me my horse, which was ruined by this ride. After dinner I went to my room, and in the morning enjoyed the pleasure of a house and a bed, for the first time since I left Newport.

*Side Note.*—This day the army marched from Somerset to Princeton.

March, 18 miles.

#### SEPTEMBER.

*September 1*—In the morning I went about in the city, which seemed to me very fine. It is large, and quite well built; the streets are very wide and straight as a string, with sidewalks on each side for travellers on foot. There are numerous shops richly supplied, and the city is quite animated, there being at least forty thousand inhabitants. In Market Street there are some immense buildings, built of brick, one of which is entirely occupied by the butchers. I saw no fault in them except that they are in the middle of a splendid street, the beauty of which they absolutely destroy. The port may be two miles long; it is simply a wharf built along the river, the only beauty of which is its length. The

place in which the Congress meets is an edifice of considerable magnitude, and the one in which the Deputies meet has nothing to commend it but its size. There are several very handsome churches, and a large college which is called a university. This is all that I saw worth mention. The house in which M. de la Luzerne lives is spacious and well enough built, and he lives in great state.

I went to see a Cabinet of Natural History belonging to a private gentleman named M. Simetiere. He is a Genevan, and has amused himself for a long time in collecting a number of curiosities in minerals, shells, birds, and every thing of this kind. He has in his house the clothing of different savage nations, arms, etc., which he has collected in his travels. I saw among these interesting objects a bad pair of heavy boots, and I asked him laughingly if they were objects of curiosity. He assured me that they attracted the attention of all Americans, who had never seen but this single pair, and that in consequence of the surprise they had excited he had ventured to pass them off for the boots of Charles XII. He showed me also a very fine collection of engravings and a large number of drawings, and even pictures of his painting, but poor. He it is who has taken the portraits of the different members of Congress, which are now engraved at Paris; he has also collected all the anecdotes of the Revolution and the American War, and all the documents published from a very remote period, by reason of which the Congress has repeatedly had recourse to him. I went

from the cabinet of M. de Simeiere to that of Doctor Chauvel, which was no less interesting, but of another kind. M. Chauvel is an Englishman who has travelled a great deal, and who is well informed on a vast range of subjects. He is most distinguished for his knowledge of anatomy. He has in his cabinet two wax figures of life size, one of a man, the other of a woman. The body of the man is dissected on one side, and the body is half opened; the different parts of the interior are made so as to be detached and restored to their places. The woman has the body open, and an eight-months' child is seen in its natural position. These two figures are so lifelike that it is impossible to see them without a certain shock. It is upon these that he so far has given his lessons of anatomy, of which he is a professor. He collects also everything relating to this subject, and in a surprising degree of perfection. He explained all to me in French in a very intelligible and even surprising way, considering that he is a man of at least seventy.

I took leave of him and went to dine with the President of the States, where our generals and their family were (as the aides-de-camp are called in America.) We had a very good English dinner. There was a turtle, weighing, perhaps, sixty to seventy pounds, which I found perfect. At dinner all sorts of healths were drank. When we left the table I returned home to write by the Franklin, which was to sail in two or three days after for France.

*Side Note.*—This day the First Brigade marched from Princeton to Trenton.

March, 12 miles.

*September 2*—I met at the house of M. de la Luzerne, M. Benezet, the most zealous Quaker of Philadelphia. I talked with him some time. He seemed to me to be convinced of the merits of his school of morals, and really a worthy man. He is small, old and ugly, but his countenance wears the stamp of a peaceful soul and the repose of a good conscience.

I rode on horseback to Germantown, where there was an engagement, the 4th of October, 1777, which did not result as favorably to the Americans as those of which I have spoken above. Germantown lies at the side of Philadelphia, and is reached by a highway, quite wide and very fine, as it is at the most six miles distant. This town consists of a single street, which may be three-quarters of a league long; the English were encamped there and occupied the two sides of the town, cutting it, as it were, in two. General Washington, who at this time was at Skipacherack (Skippach), learning that the enemy had sent detachments to Philadelphia, Chester and Wilmington to protect the supplies which were on the way, left his camp at three o'clock in the evening and marched all night to attack Germantown. He marched at first in single column, but five miles before he arrived he formed in two, took command of the right, having under him General Sullivan, and gave that of the left to General Green, who had under him General Stiven (Stephen). The right column marched by the highway which leads to the town, and detached General Armstrong with the militia to turn the left wing of the enemy. At three o'clock in the morning

the advance guard fell upon the pickets, which the 40th Regiment and the Light Infantry had passed at different distances on the road which ends at the town, which gave the alarm to these two corps, who immediately seized their arms, and, after some resistance, were compelled to fall back and were pursued to the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Mulgrave (Musgrave) who commanded the 40th Regiment, saw the importance of maintaining the communication between the two wings, and threw himself with six companies into a large stone house which stood precisely in the centre of the lines of the camp. Meanwhile, General Sullivan deployed a part of his column to attack the right wing, which, in connection with the manœuvre of the militia, threw it completely over and forced it to fall back on the right, leaving about one hundred and sixty men, who were made prisoners. The six companies who had thrown themselves into the house kept up a very brisk fire. This was the key of the position completely commanding the right of the English. This determined General Washington to attack it. To this end he brought up two pieces of six-pounders, but the balls pierced the walls without making a breach. M. de Mauduit, a French officer, who was with the army, asked permission of the General to attack it with eighty volunteers. Only twenty-seven offered themselves, together with Colonel Laurens, a warm personal friend, who made the twenty-eighth. He advanced with this handful of men, took some straw from a farm near by to set fire with, but could not succeed, all his volunteers being killed. Colonel Laurens and he, one at

the door, the other at the window which they endeavored to break in, perceived, at the end of a few minutes, that they were alone. They then walked quietly back to the remainder of the troops, in the midst of a hail of shot and bullets, which seemed to respect their courage. Colonel Laurens was slightly wounded in the shoulder, and M. Mauduit returned safe and sound. The manœuvre of the left wing did not take so favorable a turn. A heavy fog, and General Stephen, who, from what many said, had not been fasting, contributed greatly to this state of things. The General deployed, but could not put his corps in line of battle. The English, whom they expected to surprise, were already formed when they arrived in great disorder. General Washington rode up in person, rallied his troops and withdrew quietly by the same road he had taken in the morning. He took a position six miles nearer than that he had occupied the evening before. The English owed their success this day to Colonel Mulgrave (Musgrave) and the stone house.

On my return I dined with Mr. Holker, the French Consul. He entertained us excellently at a little country house which he occupies, three miles from the city, on the road to Germantown. I left him as early as I could, and went back to Philadelphia. I visited a Quaker meeting house, but had not the pleasure of seeing a single person inspired. I then returned home to render an account of my day.

*Side Note.*—This day the First Brigade encamped this side of the Red Lion Tavern, March, 18 miles.

*September 3*—The First Division of the



army arrived at Philadelphia about eleven o'clock in the morning, and in full dress. We went out to meet M. de Rochambeau, and entered the town with it amid the acclamations of the people, who could not imagine, from the idea the English had given them, that the French troops could be so fine. Passing before Congress they saluted, and the division went into camp on the Commons about a mile from the city.

*Side Note.*—When the troops deployed before the Congress, the general officers at the head of their Brigades, the President asked M. de Rochambeau if he should salute or not. The General replied that when the French troops marched past, the King deigned to salute them with kindness. This may give a slight idea of the Representative of the American nation.

March, 12 miles.

*September 4*—The Second Brigade arrived at about the same hour that the First arrived the day before, and produced as great an impression. The Regiment of Soissonnais, whose trimmings are pink, wore also its Grenadier caps, with white and great plumes, which astonished the beauties of the city. We conducted the Brigade to the camp, and saw the lines which the English constructed in the winter of '77 to '78. They reached from the Schuylkill to the Delaware. Only the traces of them remain. There were nine redoubts in front, and two forts protected the flanks.

*September 5*—The First Division united its brigades for the march to Chester, fifteen miles distant. M. de Rochambeau preferred to make the journey by boat in order to see Mud Island, Redbank and Billings-fort on the way. We embarked on the Delaware with M. de Mauduit after an excel-

lent breakfast with M. de la Luzerne. It would be difficult to imagine a more beautiful view than Philadelphia presented from the water as we left it. The banks of the Delaware are a little marshy, but the country at a little distance from it seems fertile and well cultivated. We first landed at Mud Island, where Fort Mifflin is situated. This fort is built to support the right of the chevaux-de-frise which are placed in the river to prevent the ships of the enemy from coming up. The batteries are extremely low. The fortification of this place has been begun, but the works are not yet finished. We went from there to Redbank on the left bank, where M. de Mauduit, who commanded there under Colonel Greene, showed us the manner in which he defended himself when he was attacked there by Colonel Donop at the head of 2,500 Hessians the 22d October, 1777. This fort is built on the river bank which is quite steep on this side. On his arrival here he found the fort too large for the three hundred men he had with him, and had it cut down one half. He was attacked here by two columns. The first nearly reached the old entrenchments to the north, and once there thought that they had captured the fort. His fire was so quick and well delivered that he destroyed a part of this column. In the opening M. de Mauduit had made was a (saillant) projection arranged so that his fire took the enemy in front and flank. They endeavored to defile along the river by the side of the bank, but some galleys, armed with guns charged with grape shot, opened a fire which drove them back, and they broke

in disorder. The South Column was already in the ditch but checked by the palisades. M. de Mauduit went there with some men and drove the enemy on this side, and thus remained the master of the fort. Colonel Donop, who displayed the greatest courage, received a wound from a grape shot in the thigh, from which he died two days after, having had an opportunity to judge of the courage and kindness of M. de Mauduit, who treated him with every attention, although he had summoned the fort to surrender before the attack, and to the refusal of M. de Mauduit had announced that he would give no quarter to any one. The Hessians lost more than 8 or 900 men in this attack, and the Americans thirty or forty. We next arrived at Billings fort which has been constructed to support the left of the *chevaux-de-frise*. Of the three forts we have seen this last is in the best condition, the more as its battery, which commands the river, is very well made. Fort Mifflin is not finished, and that of Redbank is destroyed. We embarked again and reached Chester. On the bank we saw General Washington who waved his hat with demonstrations of joy; and in fact, he told us on landing, that M. de Grasse had arrived in the Chesapeake with 28 ships of the line and 3000 men, whom he had already landed, and who had already marched to join M. de Lafayette to prevent Lord Cornwallis from retreating by land, while M. de Grasse cut off his escape by the sea. From this moment it was openly announced that we were marching upon Yorktown. One must have witnessed such a joyous scene as this to know the pleasure such

news give to the young men who are anxious to come under fire, and to the Generals who, after concerting a plan of campaign, see reasonable prospects of its success. He who may read this journal may easily understand the progressive movement of our Generals, and from the reflections I have permitted myself upon the secrecy which has marked this operation it appears that Lord Cornwallis is in a dangerous situation; but he is an excellent officer, and we can not yet shout victory. The joy is general; our chiefs do not conceal their own, which leads me to argue favorably of the success of this campaign. Chester is pleasantly situated on the banks of the Delaware; it is quite a large place and pretty well built.

*Side Note.*—The Second Division remained at Philadelphia, which it left on the 6th. March, 15 miles.

*September 6*—We marched to Wilmington over a very fine road. On arriving, the creek and village of Brandywine are passed, and next the town is entered. It is in one of the finest situations possible. The houses are very well built. This town is also on the banks of the Delaware. I turned off from the road to see the battle-field of Brandywine. This affair was not a success for the Americans. General Washington, learning that the greater part of the English army had embarked at New York, and a short time after had gone up Chesapeake Bay, concluded that it would land at the Head-of-Elk. He left his position at Middlebrook, in Jersey, and moved by rapid marches towards Clay Creek, in the State of Delaware, between Head-of-Elk and Phila-

delphia; but the enemy advancing upon him in force, he fell back about ten miles, and took a position behind the Brandywine on the heights before the Chad's Ford. The 11th September, 1777, General Howe, at the head of the English army, attacked him. He advanced in two columns; the right, commanded by Gen. Knyphausen, marched straight upon Chad's Ford, and attacked with vigor, as though he intended to force the passage of the ford. Meanwhile Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the left column, moved behind the mountain on the left, passed the two branches of the Brandywine four miles higher up, and followed the road which skirts the river, to fall on the left flank of the Americans. General Washington was only informed at noon of the march of Cornwallis; he at once detached General Sullivan to meet it, with orders to take a position by which he might check it. Sullivan chose an excellent one on a height commanding the road by which the column of Cornwallis came out; he rested his right upon a wood on a height over which ran a road which secured his retreat; he placed a part of his artillery in the centre, in a manner perfectly to sweep the road which leads from Buckingham Church, by which the column of the enemy was approaching. His left was posted along the crest of a hill, below which was a very marshy piece of land, which stopped the artillery which he intended to place there. He was attacked on his arrival; the right column of the English pierced his left flank, and took the artillery on this side, which was not as yet mounted. Cornwallis advanced upon the centre with his troops formed in line of battle,

and threw it into great disorder. The Americans fell back on the woods; the right wing alone kept a firm front until night, when it withdrew behind the same woods, and joined there the remnant of the troops of Sullivan, who had a new position at this point. General Washington, informed of his retreat, effected his own in good order, and marched to Chester, beyond Philadelphia. It seems that the unfortunate turn this affair took for the Americans came from Sullivan's insufficient knowledge of the country, and the short time he had at his disposal. He went astray in his march, and arrived at the same time as the enemy. If he had had time to post his artillery on his left, there is every reason to believe that he would have held his position.

*Side Note.*—M. de Damas, who remained behind at Philadelphia, and rejoined us at Wilmington, told us that it was difficult to conceive of the effect that the news of the arrival of M. de Grasse produced in Philadelphia; that M. de Luzerne was obliged to show himself to the people; in a word, that the enthusiasm was extreme.

March, 11 miles.

*September 7*—We marched to Elk Town. Leaving Wilmington the Christiana is crossed. It is evident that the roads, which are good enough now, must be very bad in winter. Elk Town is a small place, and by no means attractive.

*Side Note.*—March, 20 miles.

*September 8*—We halted; the Second Brigade joined us. M. de Rochambeau, with Messieurs de Damas and de Fersen, from this day goes in advance, to join the troops disembarked by M. de Grasse. When he left us he said that he could not take us all with him, and gave us the choice to join him by land or to go on by water.

## NOTES

**BREAK-NECK HILL.**—This well-known locality on the Kingsbridge Road took its name from an accident which is thus recorded in the *New York Journal* for June 20, 1795 :

"*A Melancholy Accident.*—The evening before last as the Harlem stage was coming down Harlem hills, the horses got masters of their reins on a full gallop, which so alarmed the driver and passengers, that in attempting to get out, one of the passengers and the driver were unfortunately killed on the spot, & several other passengers were much bruised. The names of the men killed—*Joseph Totten*, passenger, formerly a resident of Albany, & *William Baldwin*, the driver; the former of whom has left a wife & four children, the latter a wife & one child."

Some years ago Mr. McGowan, whose ancestors settled on the land now the upper end of Central Park, and gave to the narrow defile on the old post road the designation of McGowan's Pass, described to me this accident.

"These unfortunate men were thrown on their heads, which dislocated or broke their necks, and ever since this sad accident this hill has always borne the name of 'Break-neck Hill.' It was always considered dangerous, especially with farmers, who were going to the city with heavily loaded wagons, but were usually provided with a short wooden runner, on which a wheel was run, and with a strong chain was fastened to the body of the wagon. This wheel thus fastened on the runner was dragged down the hill to the foot, where the road suddenly turned toward the right."

As the origin of local names are of the highest consequence to the historian, I think the above memoranda worthy of preservation in your Magazine.

T. F. DEVOE.

**KING WILLIAM IV. A SURROGATE.**—When Prince William Henry (afterwards William IV.) landed at Newfoundland as Captain of the *Pegasus* he went on shore as *surrogate* to hold a court. He condemned a man to one hundred lashes (on a Sunday). The man received eighty and could not bear more, and it then turned out that he was the wrong person!—*One Hundred Questions in Canadian History. Montreal, 1880.*

EDITOR.

**CONDITION OF THE SIX NATIONS IN 1817.**—The Indians in the State of New York, collectively called the Six Nations, have suffered severely during the last winter in consequence of the failure of the last year's crop of Indian Corn—their principal dependence for subsistence. One tribe of 700 persons, who usually raise 7,000 or 8,000 bushels of corn in a season, raised last year not more than 50 bushels, dried in the ordinary way. By boiling the unripe corn, and drying it by the fire, they secured something more. The several tribes receive annuities from the State or United States, but they amount to no more than two or three dollars per man, and are entirely insufficient for procuring them subsistence. They have therefore been dependent on the scanty charity of a few Missionaries and others, for the means of preserving their lives. Their numbers are, respectively, as follows:—Senecas, 200; Cayugas, 100; Onondagas, 700; Tuscaroras, 316; Stockbridge tribe, 4,000. The Oneidas are not numbered.—*American Monthly Magazine, I., 228.* W. K.

A DROLL EPITAPH.—In the Groton cemetery, Mass., is the following: Mrs. Abigail Kenrick, widow of Cap't Caleb Kenrick, left her pleasant habitation in Newton, & came to her Daughter Dana's in Groton, on account of ye Civil War & Sept. 5, 1775, A. E. 76, was removed by a dysentery, to that place where ye wicked cease from troubling & ye weary are at rest.

Newport.

J. E. M.

COST OF LIVING IN NEW YORK IN 1794. — "The Tontine Coffee-House, under the care of Mr Hyde, is the best Hotel in N. York.

"He sets from 12 to 16 dishes every day.

"He charges for a years board without liquor \$350 to 400.

"Butter in the market is 37½ cts per pound; beef, compared with English beef is poor; turkeys are 62½ cts each; common fowls are 25 cents each. Of 'Albany Beef,' Sturgeon, you can get enough for 12½ cts to feed a family. Oysters are plenty and large. Peaches sell 2 cts for 3 to 6 of them. All ranks of people smoke cigars 6 or 7 inches long. Silver money is plenty, but gold is rarely seen. The population of the City is about 30,000. There are two places of public entertainment in the environs of the City that are much visited in the summer; one is called Belvedere (or Bunker's Hill) and the other Broudlings's Gardens." From a letter written by Dr. Mitchell, September, 1794.

ABRAM HOSIER.

REWARDS FOR INDIAN SCALPS.—Enclosed please find copy of a subscription list to pay for Indian Scalps, in pos-

session of the Maysville and Mason County Library, Historical and Scientific Association.

*Subscription for Capt. Campbell's company.*—Know all men by these presents, that we, the subscribers, oblige ourselves, our heirs, estates, and administrators, to pay or cause to be paid on demand, the sums of money annexed to our names, unto any person or persons, for every Indian Scalp, killed in Fayette County, or from any Indian followed by their trails out of said county, from the date hereof until the first day of January next. The Scalp being first delivered to the Court of said County, and satisfactory proof made that the Scalp was taken as above directed, shall be sufficient to entitle him or their heirs or assigns to the reward.

March 31, 1788.

|                 |    |               |    |
|-----------------|----|---------------|----|
|                 | sh |               | sh |
| H. Russell      | 3  | Wm. Heath     | —  |
| Abe Stout       | 2  | Wm. White     | 6  |
| Wm. Campbell    | 3  | Henry Conrad  | 2  |
| John Boyd       | 3  | James Peyton  | 2  |
| Jas. Fisher     | 3  | Wm. Fry       | 3  |
| Peter Goodnight | 3  | John Robinson | 2  |
| Enoch Bradford  | 2  | Thos. Brown   | 2  |
| James Logan     | 2  | Jere. Jonston | 1  |
| John Goodnight  | 3  | Henry Fry     | 2  |

With the following endorsement on the back:

Gentlemen, please to pay the bearer, William Campbell, the sums annexed to each of your names on the other side of the paper, and his receipt will be good to you, and in so doing you will oblige your humble servant.

WILLIAM GILKINSON.

Dec. 12th, 1788.

In the Centinel of the North Western

Territory, printed in Cincinnati, April 17, 1794, there is also a reward offered for Scalps, within the following bounds : within 10 miles east of the Little Miami ; 10 miles West of the Big Miami ; 25 miles north of where Harmur's trace crosses the Little Miami and the Ohio river on the south ; for every scalp, with right ear appendant, \$136, to any subscribers to the fund ; \$100 to non-subscribers for the first 10 ; for the second ten, \$117 and \$95. Nothing to Federal troops.

W. D. HIXSON.

A WAIF OF 1773.—Though the letter given below is not historical in its character, it may be worthy of republication for reasons given in the note which introduces it. It was printed in the San Antonio Herald in 1859, the remarks on it being by the editor of that paper, to whom I had lent it. I regret that I cannot send the letter itself, or the printed slip in which it is copied. The former, which was then accidentally in my possession, was soon after returned to the place where it belonged, and the latter is pasted in a scrap book ; but I can avouch for the genuineness of the former and the correctness of the latter.

R. M. POTTER.

*An Old Letter.*—The following letter, whose original, yellow with age, has just been laid before us, is interesting, not so much for the matter it contains, nor even for its early date, as from the fact that it avouches that, so early as 1773, at least one settler from New England, and a Quaker at that, was to be found on the banks of the Mississippi, not far from New Orleans, when Louisiana was a Spanish colony, and our great West an

unbroken wilderness. The place whence the letter is dated is not identified ; but it could not have been far from New Orleans, as the writer had been attending to the business of a vessel (probably the same which had brought out the "venture" he refers to), and it must have been above, for the up-river boats he mentions always ended their voyages at the city. Those from the Ohio and Illinois were probably the batteaux of American and Canadian hunters and peltry traders. What could have led Friend Richard away to what must then have been a remote, mysterious and alien region ? The hand which traced those faded lines has long since turned to dust, and the stray emigrant has gone to a still more distant land, where we trust he has found the untroubled habitation he hoped for.

At my habitation on the Mis.,

Dec. 26th, 1773.

Dear Sister.

Thine by Capt. Whipple of Oct. 28th I received with pleasure to hear that thyself and the rest of my friends are still jogging on with as much satisfaction as this uncertain world is capable of affording. Thee tells me that people wonder at my coming to this wilderness. It is indeed a wilderness at present ; but it is a fine easy country, and I don't see where I could have gone to have done better. It would have been much more agreeable to me to have lived in the place of my nativity, could I have done it upon equal terms. I have here a good living, with a little industry, which is as much as I could have expected in my own country, and as for satisfaction, I thank Divine Providence, I have en-



joyed as much since I have been here as other countries has afforded me.

"Some secret comfort every state attends."

The paths of life are so strewed with disagreeable things that the most happy are not always able to shun them. We see here abundance of different faces, some English, some French, some Spaniards, some Indians. Perhaps at the same time we have boats at our landing from New Orleans, from the Illinois, from Nacatosh, and from the Ohio. Some stop to get a dinner and some to cook their own. We have no near neighbors, none nearer than three miles, and none that we visit nearer than a league and a half; but there is a number coming soon, and it is likely to be settled with much the best people of any part of the river. The lands in our neighborhood is all in very good hands, therefore the regulators and stragglers from the back of the Carolinas cannot get a footing. However thee and I must ere long leave our settlements with all the cares, pleasures, and troubles attending them, and hope we shall be so happy as to find a habitation where trouble cannot enter.

From thy affection brother,  
Richard Carpenter.

Shall enclose the account of thy venture with friend Sisson,—receipts for the amount which I hope thee will receive. He appears to be a very worthy man, and has been of very great service in taking care of the family when I have been obliged to be absent on the vessel's account. Present my best respects to Sister Green, Sister Baglum and family,

Sisters Hannah and Betsey, and Sam Collins and spouse.

[Superscribed] to Rebekah Collins  
at Newport, Rhode Island.

SPORTSMEN IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.—A Fox Hunt. The Gentlemen of the Army, with a number of the most respectable inhabitants of Ulster and Orange, purpose a Fox Hunt on the twenty third day of this instant, where all gentlemen are invited, with their hounds and their horses. The game is plenty, and it is hoped the sport will be pleasant. The place of rendezvous will be at Mr. Samuel Wood's, in New Windsor precinct; where good usage will be given, and an elegant entertainment provided. Camp, near New Windsor, Dec. 3, 1782.—*New York Packet*, Dec. 12, 1782. PETERSFIELD.

ANCESTRY OF COLONEL JOHN ODELL.  
—Referring to the January number of the Magazine of American History, and Mr. Campbell's interesting account of Rochambeau's Headquarters in Westchester County, I beg to correct a genealogical error in regard to the ancestry of Col. John Odell.

The progenitor of the Odell family in America was Mr. William Odell, who, with his wife and family, came to Concord, Mass., about 1639. He afterwards removed to Fairfield, Conn., where he died, and his will, dated June 6th, 1676, was proved by his son, John Odell, and his son-in-law, Samuel Moorehouse. Another son of the emigrant was William Odell, Jr., of Rye, N. Y., who married a daughter of Richard Vowles, of Rye, and had three children, one of whom

was John Odell, of Fordham, N. Y., who married Hannah — and had, among other children, a son, John Odell, Jr., of Fordham, who married Hannah Vermil-yea, and died leaving a will dated Sept. 25th, 1735 (N. Y. Liber 13, p. 183), in which he mentions his "honored father, John Odell," his wife, Hannah, and his children, John, Isaac, Jonathan, Abraham, Hannah and Altien.

Jonathan Odell, of Greenburgh, N. Y., the third son, married Margaret Dyckman, and died Sept. 23d, 1818, aged 87; his wife died March 20, 1783, aged 51. They had nine children, one of whom was Colonel John Odell, of the Continental army, mentioned in Mr. Campbell's paper.

The writer has carefully verified the statements herein made, and they show that Col. Odell was descended in the line of William,<sup>1</sup> of Fairfield, William,<sup>2</sup> Jr., of Rye, John,<sup>3</sup> of Fordham, John,<sup>4</sup> Jr., of Fordham, and Jonathan,<sup>5</sup> of Greenburgh, and that he was the great-great-grandson of William of Rye, and not *grandson*, as stated by Mr. Campbell. This error doubtless had its origin in the very incorrect pedigree of the Odell family in Bolton's History of Westchester Co. This pedigree has been carefully revised and corrected for the new edition, by the undersigned, and will include material never before published.

Yonkers, N. Y. RUFUS KING.

THE NEW YORK EPISCOPATE.—The following interesting historical account of the New York Episcopate is taken from the scholarly address of the Honorable John Jay to the Right Reverend Bishop Potter, on occasion of the presentation

to him, at the Academy of Music in New York, of a casket, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his consecration.

More than two centuries have passed since that Church, in the time of Charles II., was planted in this seat of your episcopate, on the surrender by the Dutch of New Netherlands, with its quaint and rustic New Amsterdam, now this great and still increasing capital.

Its members went hand in hand with those of the Reformed Church of Holland, and with the Huguenots, who blended with their pure faith and heroic blood memories of struggle and suffering for religious freedom. With such brave companionship the Church of England, represented by the parish of Trinity, founded in the reign of William and Mary, assisted to establish King's College, aided by the bounty of Queen Anne, to spread abroad the sound doctrine, the classic culture, and the broad and manly thought which were felt at each step of the revolution, which commanded the admiration of the British senate, and which, in the infancy of the Republic, gave character to its statesmanship, diplomacy and jurisprudence.

When Drs. White and Provoost were leaving for England to be consecrated at Lambeth, in 1787, an event pictured on the token prepared for this anniversary, they bore a certificate from the President of Congress, Richard Henry Lee, that the business on which they went was consistent with the civil institutions of the American republic.

The certificate was within the truth. No feature of our Church then or since has been inconsistent with our civil or religious liberties. There has been no encroachment on the divine right of the State; no priestly intermeddling with our politics; no perversion of the Church to the amassing of wealth, the attainment of power, the warping of legislation; no attempt to control and dwarf popular education, to stunt or pervert the human intellect, or to arrest the course of modern progress.

From the first day of the episcopate of Bishops White and Provoost to this interesting period in your own, our Church, with its sacred mem-

ories extending through the ages to the birth of Christianity, adorned with endless processions of holy men, marked by conflicts for the truth, by warnings and by beacons; pure in doctrine, apostolic in government, simple and majestic in its ritual and liturgy; repressing extravagance on the one hand, and encouraging piety on the other; our Church has been in this Western Republic the faithful guardian of its institutions; and it stands to-day the staunch promoter of national brotherhood, Christian civilization, and constitutional freedom.

Our civil war, the chief event of the quarter century embraced by your episcopate, has given new significance to an incident that associated the prayers of our Church with the commencement of the national government in the historic service at St. Paul's chapel, which was attended by Washington and his associates after his inauguration in Federal Hall. It is a pleasant memory as we enter upon a second century amid the rejoicings of Christian peoples at the preservation of the republic, when unfriendly courts had hoped that we were *in extremis*, and after the sovereign pontiff, assuming our dissolution, had recognized the confederacy and welcomed its envoys. This happy assemblage in your honor, with representatives from all parts of our again peaceful and united country, reminds us how the prayers of Washington and the fathers of the republic were answered in our late troubles, and how idle were the calculations of those who amid the widespread schemings for its destruction failed to recognize with the Psalmist that "the Lord reigneth, be the people never so impatient; He sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never so unquiet."

EDITOR.

### QUERIES

THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN NEW YORK.—I am desirous to obtain all the information possible respecting the early history of the Department of State.

I had supposed that the office of

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when first established was located in the City Hall building in the city of New York. My belief was strengthened by the resolution of Congress of 18th January, 1785, accepting the offer of the Common Council of New York, to give Congress such parts of the City Hall and *other* public buildings belonging to the Corporation as Congress should deem necessary. Congress accepted the several apartments in the City Hall, the whole of which, it was stated (except the Court and Jury room), would be necessary for the Session of Congress and the accommodation of their officers.

Now the very first charge which appears on the book of account of expenditures by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the following, January 19, 1785: A cartman for hauling two boxes belonging to the office *from* the City Hall where they had been carried through mistake with the boxes of the Secretary's office, £0, s 4, d 0. I judge from this that Mr. Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, did not have his office in the City Hall, but in some other building.

On the 20th appears the following charge: Laborers for opening rough boxes and carrying the cases contained therein *up stairs*, £0, s 4, d 0.

On the 23d, a woman for sweeping and scrubbing 4 Rooms £0, s 11, d 0.

Judging from the above, the office must have occupied at least four rooms, and they were probably located up stairs—not a principal story. A change appears to have been made in the month of May, 1788, as the book shows that on the 5th May, 1788, Abraham Okie, the messenger to the office, was paid £2,

56, *d* 1, "for removing the office to the Broadway."

On October 2, 1788, a Committee appointed to consider about room for Congress reported, that "the repairs and alterations intended to be made in the buildings in which Congress at present assembles, will render it highly inconvenient for them to continue business therein; that it will therefore be necessary to provide some other place for their accommodation. The Committee having made enquiry find no place more proper for the purpose than the *two* apartments now appropriated for the office of Foreign Affairs. They therefore recommend that the said apartments be immediately repaired for the reception of Congress and the papers of the Secretary." Congress agreed to the report.

On the book of expenditures the following charge appears:

Oct. 3, 1788. By cash paid Anthony Clawson for removing the effects from the old to the new office, £1, 5 5, *d* 0.

On June, 1789, is a charge: Elias Nexen, for office rent from 2d October, 1788, to 1st May, 1789, £40.

From this I suppose that Mr. Nexen owned the building.

The department removed from New York to Philadelphia in 1790. On October 5, 1790, the following charge appears:

By cash paid for carting the effects in the City Hall, that were to go by hand to the office in Broadway, the corporation having required the delivery of the rooms, nine loads, £0, 5 14, *d* 0.

Mr. Jay received salary as Secretary

of State, from and including December 21, 1784, to September 25, 1789.

Any information concerning the building that was occupied by the Foreign Office in those early days will be gratefully received by

JOHN H. HASWELL.

*Washington, D. C.*

GEORGE'S BANKS.—There are extensive and dangerous shoals in the Atlantic Ocean east of Cape Cod and south of the State of Maine. Henry Hudson, on his voyage of 1609, noticed them in his journal, but they must have been known to the early Basque and Breton fishermen. They have been known as George's Shoals or Banks from an early date. When and why was this name applied to them? B.

DUTCH TILES.—When were they first introduced into America? Is there any evidence of their having been used in this country before the year 1700?

NEW AMSTERDAM.

WASHINGTON'S ENGRAVED PORTRAITS.—To the list of Washington Portraits in your February number I wish to add the following:

1. "General Washington" (name of engraver not known). Full length, in uniform, standing in front of a tent, the opening draped on either side, his right hand is in his waistcoat, in his left he holds a roll of documents, on the uppermost ones are inscribed "Declaration of Independence—When," "Treaty of Alliance between His Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America;" on a roll below "Battle of

Monmouth;" on the left a camp-stool, military hat, &c.; at the right a portfolio, with documents, maps, &c., with various inscriptions; under his feet documents inscribed "George III., by the Grace of God of Great Britain King Defender of the Faith," "Protection to Rebels on Submission," &c. At his right stands his horse, held by a negro. The print is colored. Size 10 x 13 inches. (Line).

2. An original miniature, painted on ivory, by "Henry Fullerton, Fect," in profile; oval; size  $1\frac{7}{8} \times 2\frac{1}{2}$  inches.

Is there a copy of the engraved portrait in any known collection?

JEREMIAH COLBURN.

*Boston, April 10, 1880.*

# REPLIES.

THE NAME OF DULUTH.—(IV., 180). In Mr. Robertson's article on the Mound-Builders of America for March, 1880, occurs the following passage:

"Just so in later days, the name of the Indian chief Duluth, to whom was committed a century ago the charge of the ill-fated heroine of the American Revolution, Jane McCrea, whose sad story and fate are embalmed in history, song and romance, has reappeared as the name of a thriving town at the extreme western end of Lake Superior, thirteen hundred miles from the scene of the tragedy, and the name comes, I believe, from a local tradition of a local Duluth."

The following information concerning the "original" Duluth may be of interest to Mr. Robertson:

Daniel Greylosen Du Lhut, born at Lyons, France, date unknown; was at

Quebec in 1677; left there in September, 1678, on an exploring expedition to the Sioux country around the headwaters of the Mississippi; took possession of that country in the name of the French king, and built a *trading post on Lake Superior near Thunder Bay*. In 1680, while traveling in the Sioux country, he heard of a white man lower down on the Mississippi, and at once went in search of him. It proved to be Father Louis Hennepin, who, soon after parting with La Salle at the mouth of the Illinois to explore the Mississippi northward, was taken prisoner by the Sioux, and but for the fortunate arrival of Du Lhut, would probably have lost his life among the savages. In 1686 he built a fort where Detroit now stands. In 1687 he headed a body of warriors from about Lake Superior, and, in company with Henri de Tonti and others, joined the French under Denonville against the Iroquois. In 1689 he was at Montreal at the time of the Iroquois invasion, and bore himself in a very heroic manner. In 1695 he was in command of Fort Frontenac. In 1697 he was a captain of Infantry. His death occurred in 1710 while still in the king's service.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Indians, from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi, were familiar with the name of Du Lhut.

I. P. JONES.

*Keytesville, Missouri.*

ARNOLD AND WASHINGTON FREEMANSON.—(III., 578, 761). In 1860-'1, Mr. Abraham Tomlinson exhibited to the writer, at 52 Wall Street, New York, a Masonic lodge-book, containing minutes of meetings at a place or places up the

North River, not very remote from West Point. There were present as visitors on one occasion two distinguished American officers, whose autographs were recorded in the book, viz :

GEORGE WASHINGTON

BENEDICT ARNOLD (*erased*)

At a later period, by reason of the latter's treason, the lodge may have ordered the usual slight erasure-marks of striking his name from the rolls for cause or expulsion, or it may have been done by "some zealous patriot," as intimated ; but it did not alter the fact of his being there with Washington. Inasmuch as the lodge records were viewed by several persons, the note on p. 148, in Mr. Arnold's Life of General Benedict Arnold, is substantially correct.

HENRY T. DROWNE.

THE FRIGATE AMERICA, 1749.—(IV., 224). I would refer "Kittery" to my article on "Ships of War built at Portsmouth, N. H.," published in the New England Historical and Genealogical Register for October, 1868, for some account of the America, built in 1749. There is also a model of her preserved in the Portsmouth Athenæum, which was presented to that institution by Madame Elwyn, daughter of Governor Langdon. The model is pierced for 44 guns on two decks. She is said to have been built at the north part of the city of Portsmouth on the main land.

GEO. H. PREBLE.

A WASHINGTON RELIC.—(IV., 224). Washington's Gift of a Box to Shenandoah. This is at least the third time that

a query in regard to the existence of this box has gone the rounds of the newspapers—in 1831, 1872, and now. It was thus editorially answered in the Manlius Repository of February 22, 1831: "We can find no person who knows such a man as the De Bois above mentioned, nor has our village any Trustees, the charter of Incorporation having run long before 1828. Therefore, from what we can learn, we conclude the box is a fabrication of some of the Boston sharpers." Having resided here over fifty years, I can confidently say there has never been any such box here in that time.

H. C. V. S.

*Manlius, April 6, 1880.*

MACHIAS.—(IV., 222). The name is explained by Dr. Ballard, in his "Geographical Names," p. 12, as from the Indian "*Matcho*," bad, and "*sis*," a diminutive, meaning a "bad small fall," being "probably" applied to distinguish it from a larger fall given miles higher up.

QUOD.

— Mr. Kidder's "Military Operations in Eastern Maine," p. 33, says that Alleston & Vines, "traded in the harbors, and established a small trading house at Machias in 1633," which first brings that name into history.

*New York.*

PEMAQUID.

ANNEKE JANS.—(IV., 222). Holland had had no kings when Anneke Jans came to New Netherland with her mother, consequently her so-called heirs cannot claim King William IV., of Holland, as their ancestor.

*Albany.*

B. F.



(Publishers of Historical Works wishing Notices, will address the Editor, with Copies, Box 100, Station D—N. Y. Post office.)

THE ENGRAVED PORTRAITS OF WASHINGTON, WITH NOTICES OF THE ORIGINALS, AND BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE PAINTERS, by W. S. BAKER. Philadelphia: LINDSAY & BAKER. 1880. Pp. 212. Edition, 500 Copies.

A reliable and exhaustive list of these engravings has long been desired, and the appearance of Mr. Baker's book is hailed with delight by collectors both old and young. They can now refer to the engravings by quoting the numbers only, which are attached to each work, thus saving long descriptions and much confusion. The collection of such portraits become more interesting to the young, who has now a sure guide in his search, and will be equally welcome to the veteran, who may have been often puzzled by the want of any description of the *desiderata* to his collection.

Should the work be properly appreciated, as we feel sure it will be, another edition may be illustrated with outlines of the rarer prints, or the variations in the impressions from one plate. The author has very sensibly issued this edition without plates, which would have enhanced its cost considerably. Up to this time no systematic list had been published, and collectors could only compare their lists or their prints in order to determine what was to be sought for.

The thorough system adopted by the author is most praiseworthy, and is well carried out. The arrangement of the prints in groups, according to the painters of original portraits, is a feature that commends itself at the first glance, and the short notices of the painters are very opportune and interesting. Dunlap had included them in his "History of the Arts of Design in America," and Rembrandt Peale in his lectures named most of them, but neither of these gave any information concerning the numerous engraved portraits which they must have examined.

Tuckerman, in his *Iconography*, the only work on the subject, endeavored conscientiously to collect all the materials he could, and examined all the paintings that were accessible. As an author his style is excellent, but his judgment was not that of an artist, and he extols the oft-repeated Stuart portrait without according their proper merit to some others. He gave no list of engravings, and the plates in his work were costly, while the edition was very limited. The publishers, Messrs. Putnam, might issue another edition of it with good hope of profit thereby.

But to return to Mr. Baker's list. He says, in his Preface, that with two unimportant ex-

ceptions, he has been able to examine all the prints he enumerates. This fact alone is enough to invite attention and inspire confidence in his work, which, coupled with his known experience as a collector and as the author of other similar published lists, leaves nothing to be desired at present.

The patience and perseverance under difficulties, until success had crowned the long and apparently unequal struggle with the mother-country, made Washington the most remarkable man of modern times. His moderated and unselfish ambition place him as the foremost patriot of all time, and it is not remarkable that we should be proud of his fame and jealous of his memory. This has led to the great demand for the portraiture of "the Father of his Country." It is said that his stepson, the late George Washington Parke Custis, had collected over two thousand five hundred different engravings, woodcuts and lithographs, of him, the location of which we cannot ascertain, but probably double that number have been published. It is therefore important, in seeking to gratify the public want, that only the well-attested portraits should be reproduced. Of course, Mr. Baker had to include all the prints that he could find, whether the originals were considered a close likeness or otherwise. He has dealt cautiously with this subject, but we are not yet sure that Stuart's portraits deserve the wide-spread celebrity they have attained. Stuart had but short sittings of him, for the head only, when he was using artificial teeth. He certainly gave too much color to his complexion and a certain flabbiness to the muscles, not indicated in earlier portraits and busts. The retreating but high forehead, so distinctly shown by Houdon, Savage, Trumbull, and Pine, and in all the profiles taken of him, is not indicated by Stuart. Luckily for Stuart, his portraits became the rage, and he painted so many copies of them that his likeness is accepted generally as the best. Looking at it with impartial and cool judgment, we cannot endorse this opinion. Throwing out the indubitably poor likenesses, we believe that the Houdon bust and the Pine portrait best reproduce to our eyes Washington as he appeared shortly after the close of the war. Of his appearance previous to 1785, we have no trustworthy portrait. There is a disposition to heroic exaggeration in the Trumbull and Rembrandt Peale portraits, and the Ceracchi bust, that can be easily detected.

Fifty-six pages of Mr. Baker's work are devoted to the Stuart portraits, under two hundred numbers, and the public favor will probably always be accorded to it, but the difference of

the Stuart portraits from each other excites and invites criticism. In a work recently published on Gilbert Stuart, there are two reproductions of these, and if either one of them is a likeness the other is certainly not so, for they differ very widely. Leaving this question aside for the present, let us take the impartial list and use it as designed by its author.

The prints enumerated are so various in artistic finish that Mr. Baker has perhaps wisely avoided making many remarks on their merit in this respect. At No. 21 we may remark that a similar but less elaborate picture, perhaps like Nos. 22 or 23, by Paon, is hung in the large parlor of Cozzens's West Point Hotel. The late W. N. B. Cozzens received it, we believe, from General Lafayette, who had sent for his son Edward to educate him in France. The forty-five first numbers on Mr. Baker's list were probably all from original or copied portraits by C. W. Peale, and but few collectors have more than half of them. The Alexander Campbell plates, of which seventeen are given, are all rare, having been published a century ago. The Du Simitière profiles are ten in number, and the latest is of 1816. There is one from Dunlap, and twenty-four of the curious Wright portraits are given. Of the Pine portrait the one is very good, the other is a combination portrait, showing no resemblance to the original. Of the Houdon statue or bust, there is no really good engraving among the eleven named.

The postage-stamp profile, a poor caricature of this fine bust, is properly omitted from the list. Of the James Peale portrait, the two plates belonged to the late James Lenox. They are well executed and do credit to the engravers. The next portrait, a profile by Mme. de Bréhan, was engraved in France in 1790; and another plate accompanied the translation into French by himself of Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur's "Letters from an American Farmer," which appeared in 1782. Burt copied his plate from an impression which once belonged to Washington. We may here perhaps mention the fact that Mme. de Bréhan gave a copy of her miniature to the General, who presented it to his friend Dr. Stewart, with a record of the presentation in his own hand on its back. Mr. George Bancroft found it some years since in the possession of a New York family, and was allowed to have it photographed. It has not, we believe, been engraved. The curious Gulager portrait, painted in Boston for Mr. Breck (not Brick), has only once been engraved.

The Savage portrait is another curious type of the features of Washington, which appear swollen and the eyes are squinting. Mr. Baker describes twenty-three prints of this school, some of which are quite scarce. There is more animation in Trumbull's than in any other portrait. He had to struggle against nearsighted-

ness, but his natural talent as a colorist, and his general accuracy in portrait painting, incline us to value his portrait very highly, and as ranking above Stuart's. Among the twenty-three prints in the list, there is not one that does it justice.

Robertson's type cannot be classed among the good likenesses. It has been engraved only once in the last fifty years. The Ceracchi bust is a semiheroic type, and reminds one of Louis Philippe more than of Washington. It has been engraved twice in this country. Passing over a few others, not of great value, we come to Gilbert Stuart's portrait, of which there are endless copies on copper, steel, wood, and stone. Mr. Baker, as we said before, describes two hundred engravings that he has seen, but we cannot dwell on any of them here. The actual copies of the Boston Athenæum head are, of course, preferable to any others. In the full-length the expression differs, and most of Stuart's own copies are unlike each other. It is perhaps not generally known that one of the full-lengths, painted for Mr. Meade, of Philadelphia, was left by his son in Madrid, and belongs to the American legation. It ought to be brought to this country again. The Athenæum head is best rendered in Marshall's fine engraving, but no good one of a full-length has been published, except Heath's, in which the expression is lost.

There are a few prints from Rembrandt Peale's head, but Peale was very young when he first painted his portrait, and he gradually altered it until he reached an ideal type, which he put on stone twice, the last one being a remarkable production. The Sharpless profile deserves to be re-engraved and published. It confirms the St. Mémin profile, the last of which would make a fine design for the three-cent postage-stamp.

Mr. Baker closes his work with a notice of two *silhouettes*, of several memorial designs of little artistic value, and with a number of fictitious portraits. The memorial which he credits to Tanner, is a third state of the plate which was engraved by J. J. Barralet, who revised No. 217, but whose name is omitted in the Index. The last article, "Statuary," could have been enlarged and made interesting, for Mr. Baker has admitted many engravings from portraits of uncertain origin. He might have also noticed the two Wedgwood medallions, which are not noticed by numismatists. However, we must not ask for too much in this first attempt, which does Mr. Baker much credit, for he has well fulfilled the promise made on the title page.

The work is well printed, and deserves encouragement from all who are interested in this branch of literature.

J. CARSON BREVOORT.

**PROGRESSIVE JAPAN, A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL NEEDS OF THE EMPIRE.** By GENERAL LE GENDRE. 8vo, pp. 370. New York and Yokohama. C. LEVY, Publisher, 1878.

Probably no living foreigner has ever had the same political influence in the Empires of China and Japan, or such opportunities for a study of their resources, as the distinguished gentleman whose name appears on this volume. Although a Frenchman by birth, and educated in Paris, General Le Gendre [Charles W.] is by inclination, by adoption, and by long meritorious services and honorable wounds, a citizen of the United States. One of those young foreigners whose sympathies were for liberty, while his blood stirred at the sound of arms, he enlisted as Major in the 51st New York Volunteers, was severely wounded in the face at Roanoke, promoted Lieutenant Colonel, then Colonel, again badly hurt at the battle of the Wilderness, and finally breveted Brigadier General after four years of arduous and brilliant service. During the intervals of active campaigning, while engaged in recruiting service, under surgical treatment for his wounds, his active mind was engaged in the study of the important problems suggested by it, and he submitted to the Government an admirable plan for the organization of the blacks, which, if adopted, might have averted many of the difficulties which at present attend the negro question. He proposed the districting of the colored men into commanderies under white officers in the beginning, their own officers later, thus forming a mixed military organization for protection and labor. Sir George Campbell, in his recent volume on *White and Black*, has noted the readiness with which the negroes fall into military ways, and their superiority in discipline and drill over their white neighbors.

At the close of the war, 1866, General Le Gendre was appointed Consul to Amoy, where he at once displayed his administrative ability and rectitude of character by a thorough reform of the office, into which innumerable abuses had insensibly crept. He needed no Civil Service reform commission to instruct him in his duty. In 1867 a French coolie ship which was chartered to an American reached Amoy with her illicit cargo. The American captain was instantly arrested by Consul Le Gendre, punished by fine and imprisonment, and the coolie trade definitively broken up. The same year an American barque was wrecked on the coast of Formosa, and her crew murdered by the lawless pirates which infested this island. The captain of an English man-of-war attempted to interfere, but was driven off. The instant the news reached Amoy General Le Gendre, after the failure of a United States marine expedition against the murderers, took the matter into his own hands,

visited Foochow, and obtained a Chinese gunboat from the Viceroy; with this, and the co-operation of the local officers, an expedition was raised, which he accompanied; the Formosans were brought to terms by the vigor of the military movement, an agreement concluded, and amicable terms established with the Formosans. While on this expedition the General made a large collection of fossils, minerals, and other specimens, which he afterwards deposited in the Museum of Natural History, New York (Central Park). After six years of service and unremitting study of the Chinese Empire, his name was sent in to the Senate by President Grant as Minister to Buenos Ayres, and he left Amoy to return home. On his departure the foreign residents of Amoy sent a cheque for five hundred pounds to the New York Chamber of Commerce, to be invested in a testimonial of their regard.

Meanwhile, in 1871 a Japanese crew, wrecked on the coast of Formosa, had been murdered by the inhabitants, and Japan had resolved on punishment. At Yokohama, on his way to the United States, General Le Gendre was informed of this purpose, and at the instance of the American Minister to Japan was induced to remain over a steamer to advise with himself and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after this first interview he was requested to take service with the Government of the Mikado; he at first declined, but was finally induced to accept the appointment. This was in 1872, since which period he has been regularly employed in the Japanese service. In his intervals of leisure, with untiring patience and industry, he has made a careful study of the condition of Japan, which has already made a progress in the arts of Western civilization unparalleled by any other Eastern nation. The result is the volume before us. From it we extract the following observations:

The civilization of Japan has been the work of her aristocracy. Her people as a whole, the husbandmen and traders, in that passive existence to which they have been trained for a thousand years, are ignorant of the change in the political fabric. In 1867 there was an administrative revolution in Japan which took from the nobles the temporal power, brought back the direction of affairs to the Mikado, and restored the ancient freedom of the people. The Mikado, it must be remembered, by the mechanism of the Japanese Government, is a sacred personage, the source of all authority. In the lapse of time the Government had degenerated into a bureaucracy under the direction of the Daimios. In 1875 a more radical reform was adopted, the Mikado establishing, by a decree, two legislative houses, which in fact were little more than government bureaus. Practically the system now in force is that of uncontrolled absolutism. The General considers that those to whom the Mikado delegated the power to estab-

lish the new order have done well. The privileges of the aristocracy have been curtailed, torture abolished, woman emancipated, agriculture, manufactures and commerce, before despised occupations, raised to honor, public schools established, railroads and telegraphs built—in a word, a Western civilization introduced, set led and progressive.

In addition to this exhaustive view of the Empire, the indefatigable editor supplies numerous extensive statistical tables. One, a marvel of industry, displays in parallel columns the territorial divisions, their population, husbandry and taxation, agriculture, forests, fisheries, manufactures, viz., tea, tobacco, wood articles, drugs, medicines, food, paper, oil and wax, porcelain and pottery, nets, ropes, matings, &c., curios, silk and cotton manufactures, and mines and quarries, showing an annual value of 428,668,316 *yens*, the *yen* being about the equivalent of a dollar in value. The work has had an unprecedented sale for a work of this character, and the first edition is exhausted, having been chiefly taken up by the Japanese and English. We commend it to all having relations with the Far East.

**A HISTORY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.** With Biographical Sketches of the Secretaries. By L. D. INGERSOLL. 8vo, pp. 612. FRANCIS B. MOHUN, Washington, 1880.

The author, in his preface, while acknowledging his use of published official reports and documents, and his obligations to the General of the army, the chiefs of the various staff departments at Washington, and the chief clerks of all the bureaus of the War Department, distinctly presents his history to the public as a purely unofficial work, entirely the author's private essay. Divided into two parts, the first embraces a general narrative, in which the organization of the department, its official labors during the last war with Great Britain and that with Mexico, its subsequent history, are treated of, together with special chapters on its Buildings, Bureaus, and Indian affairs. The second part contains a series of concise, well-digested biographical sketches of the Secretaries, from Gen. Knox, Washington's first Secretary, to George W. McCreary, the thirty-third and present incumbent. An appendix gives rosters of the subdivisions of the department. Two fine steel illustrations show the old War Department building and the present magnificent State, War, and Navy Department building.

The book is written in narrative style, and may be classed with what are now termed popular as distinguished from technical histories. The general reader need not, therefore, be restrained by the title. It is full of historical information, conveyed in an attractive manner.

The author's judgments are cool and impartial, and his moderation in condemnation most commendable.

**ESSAYS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.** Edited by ALLEN THORNDIKE RICE. 12mo, pp. 482. D. APPLETON & Co., New York, 1879.

No more welcome volume has appeared for many a day than this excellent selection from the publications of this famous Review, which was for many years at the very head of American periodicals, and a worthy exponent of our thought and scholarship; and we trust that the enterprising and public-spirited editor will find encouragement to follow up this excellent beginning. Of the present selections Mr. Rice claims that they "represent the growth of native thought and scholarship in the United States, from the close of the second war with Great Britain down to the close of the great civil war." That the pages of the North American Review show this none will deny; nowhere may this progress be better noticed—but this selection is not a proof of it. The essays written by Irving, Cushing, and Emerson, from 1832 to 1838, show quite as ripe a thought and scholarship as those by Curtis and Lowell thirty years later. Twelve essays are given from the pens of Prescott, Cushing, Emerson, Bancroft, Motley, Irving, Adams, Longfellow, Curtis, Parkman, Lowell, and Holmes; they are all gems; of different but equal brilliancy.

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH LITERATURE; THE OLD ENGLISH PERIOD.** By BROTHER AZARIAS [of the Brothers of the Christian Schools]. 12mo, pp. 210. D. APPLETON & Co., New York, 1879.

The author announces this volume to be the first of a series of three intended as class books. This is a modest envoi of one of the most interesting, instructive, and it is not too much to add, fascinating works that have appeared in this prolific year of American literature. In it are traced the growth and development of Old English thought, as expressed in Old English Literature, from the first dawns of history down to the Norman Conquest. The impulse to language and literature is sought and found in the manners and customs of the people.

With a richness of illustration which shows an intimate acquaintance with the whole range of early Welsh, Saxon, Celtic and Scandinavian literature, from the poem of Beowulf, the paraphrase of Caedmon, to the Christian songs of Cynewulf and the monkish stories of the Venerable Bede, the learned author never loses sight of the canon of criticism, which he proclaims in his preface, that in the literature of every people there is a part common to the human race, a part

common to cognate races, a part borrowed from one of these races, and the residue the people's own.

Most interesting is the admirable chapter on the condition of woman among the Teuton races, as Tacitus found them, and as they appear in the Sagas of the North. The closing chapters relate the influence of the Norman, and prepare the way for the second volume, which will open with the Conquest. We seek in vain for words of sufficient praise.

#### A CHAPTER OF AMERICAN CHURCH

HISTORY. By EDWARD D. NEILL [from the New Englander for July, 1879]. 8vo, pp. 471 to 486.

In these pages an elaborate account is given of the caves of Eleuthera, an island about twenty-eight miles distant from San Salvador, where Columbus first landed on the Western hemisphere. To these caves the first independent church of the Somers Island, or Bermudas, retired to avoid persecution. The royalist authorities of the distant settlement would not submit to the authority of Parliament, and, safe in their distance from home, expressed detestation of the execution of Charles the First, and declared, July 5, 1649, for Charles, Prince of Wales, as their rightful sovereign. All protection was withdrawn from those who did not conform to the ecclesiastical laws of England, and the Independents of Bermuda went into exile at Eleuthera. Here they were aided and comforted by supplies and counsel from the New England Puritans. Later the severity of Charles the Second increased the number and spirit of the non-conformists at Bermuda, who in 1663 sent a vessel with supplies to their old friends. In 1669 William Sayle, the founder of Eleuthera, was commissioned Governor of Carolina. With his departure the sketch closes.

#### MONO-METALISM AND BI-METALISM;

OR, THE SCIENCE OF MONETARY VALUES. By J. B. HOWE. 16mo, pp. 206. HOUGHTON, OSGOOD & Co., Boston, 1879.

Attention has already been called in these pages to two previous works on the money question by this author: "Political Economy in the Use of Money" [II., 765], and "Monetary and Industrial Fallacies" [III., 66]. In the first of these notices the difficulty was pointed out of arriving at any mutual understanding without an agreement upon the precise meaning of the terms of the argument. The same difficulty arises in the preliminary statement made by Mr. Howe in the preface to the present essay, which he admits is "based upon the theory that no money, not even gold or silver, has, or by any

possibility can have, so far as it is money, any commodity or mercantile value whatever." But it has a commodity value—it is sold by weight and fineness quite independently of its stamp. In the colonial days, for instance, when the American cities were full of clipped and debased coins, Spanish, Mexican, French, Dutch, and English, every merchant carried his scales and weighed them out. In our custom houses to this day coins are weighed. In Hamburg, where every known coinage abounds, they are measured in every transaction, and the result cast in a fictitious money of account, the marc-banco, which has not even an existence except as a name of value. The essay before us applies the author's unit or conventional theory to the question of the single or double standard. The most curious chapter in the book is that which explains the author's theory that "gold is an abstract monetary unit to all the other commodities in the world, silver excepted; and silver is an abstract monetary unit to all commodities in the world, gold excepted." This may be true, and if true important, were there any mode of ascertaining the precise quantities of commodities and the precise quantities of precious metals, and thus establishing a ratio; but this is not the case, and the quantities of each are constantly varying, both in sum and ratio.

The measure of value is a different thing from value itself—the bank metal is commodity, the stamp affixed by government makes it money; when depreciated to any extent by abrasion, it no longer passes at its stamped value—commodities will not be exchanged for it except at an increased price—Government must take it in, or it becomes discredited. When it is needed for export to correct the balances of trade, it is bought as a commodity. It is only money in the country where it is coined; it must be re-coined in a foreign country to become money in it. But why pursue a discussion where the disagreement on the meaning of terms is so radical?

#### THE SUNRISE KINGDOM; OR, LIFE

AND SCENES IN JAPAN, AND WOMAN'S WORK FOR WOMAN THERE. By MRS. JULIA D. CARRITHERS. 12mo, pp. 408. PRESBYTERIAN BOARD OF PUBLICATION, Philadelphia, 1879.

Seven years of missionary life of an earnest woman are embraced in these pages, which are full of interest to a far wider circle than she intended to address. It would be hard to find a chapter of human history more striking than that which tells of the entrance of Japan, in little more than a quarter of a century, to the ranks of civilized nations, or it is more correct to say the brotherhood of nations. The Japanese are the Yankees of the East, a race in some respects of a standard not so high intellectually as the Chinese, but which has shown itself much more



amenable to outward impressions, and ready to accept and apply to themselves the results of foreign science.

Mrs. Carrothers is an excellent observer, and gives an admirable account of the natives and their mode of life. She thoroughly appreciates their characteristics and qualities. She says of them that they are a cultivated people, with disciplined minds, and that science and religion go hand in hand with them; and she generously confesses that the missionaries have to strain every nerve to equal the native schools. The book is full of appropriate illustrations.

AS TO KEARSAGE MOUNTAIN AND THE CORVETTE NAMED FOR IT. 32mo, pp. 56. Printed by the REPUBLICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, Concord, N. H., 1879.

In Johnson's Cyclopædia, recently published, Mr. G. V. Fox, late Assistant Secretary of the Navy, states that the famous vessel which sunk the Alabama in 1864 was named in honor of Kearsage Mount, a conspicuous mountain in Carroll County, N. H., and that the claim put forward that it was named after another peak of the same name in Merrimac County, N. H., formerly called Kya-Sarga, is erroneous. *Hinc ille lachryme.* The men of Concord chafe under this assumption and this pamphlet vindicates her claim to the original Simon pure Kearsage. The venerable Whittier, who sang of the pines of Kearsage in "The Drovers," comes to the rescue, and writes to the author of this "defense" that it was to the Merrimac Kearsage that he tuned his lyre. This should settle the question.

ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING OF THE DESCENDANTS OF COLONEL THOMAS WHITE OF MARYLAND, HELD AT SOPHIA'S DAIRY, ON THE BUSH RIVER, MARYLAND, JUNE 7, 1877. Including papers read on that occasion, together with others referred to, and since prepared. [Large paper] 4to, pp. 40. Philadelphia, 1879.

This elaborate volume contains five distinct papers, namely, I., a sketch of Col. White's life, by William White Willbank; II., a biographical notice of Bishop White and his descendants, by J. Brinton White; III., a short biography of Mrs. Robert Morris, Col. White's daughter, by Charles Henry Hart; IV., the English ancestor of Col. Thomas White, by Joseph Lemuel Chester, with an introduction by Reed; V., a table of the descendants of Col. White, by Thomas Harrison Montgomery.

Mr. Hart's paper has already been noticed. Col. Chester's paper is of considerable interest, and unusually thorough; Bishop White's Church of England ancestry and attachments are well


shown. Until Col. Chester undertook the task, nothing definite was known of the ancestors of the distinguished prelate and friend of Washington beyond his father and mother. The pedigree was finally found and recorded in the volume containing the Herald's Visitation of Buckinghamshire in 1634. In it are the name and descendants of John White, of Hulcote, in the County of Bedford, the birthplace of Bishop White. It is here shown to have been a High Church and Jacobite family.

Col. Thomas White was a good American Whig, as is shown by a letter still extant, in which he attaches a condition to an order sent to England for a watch and some Irish linen sheeting, "not if the stamp act be unrepealed." Mr. Montgomery mentions the names of numerous families descended from or allied to that of White: Ambler, Aspend, Atterbury, Barnard, Biddle, Bird, Bolton, Brinton, Bronson, Brooke, Chew, Downes, Dulany, Egerton, Fisher, Francis, Garretson, Hull, Harrison, Heath, Hewlings, Kane, Key, Leigh, McHenry, Macpherson, Marshall, Montgomery, Morris, Nixon, Paca, Presbury, Ramsay, Reid, Rodgers, Shoemaker, Stark, Utie, Van den Heuvel, Wilson, and Willbank.

A-SADDLE IN THE WILD WEST; A GLIMPSE OF TRAVEL AMONG THE MOUNTAINS, LAVA BEDS, SAND DESERTS, ADOBE TOWNS, INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND ANCIENT PUEBLOS OF SOUTHERN COLORADO, NEW MEXICO AND ARIZONA. By WILLIAM H. RIDEING. 16mo, pp. 165. (Appleton's New Handy Volume Series.) D. APPLETON & Co., New York, 1879.

Here is a bright, readable sketch of personal experience, by a gentleman who rode some four thousand miles a-saddle in New Mexico, Arizona, Southern Colorado, Nevada and Eastern California, accompanying Lieutenant George M. Wheeler on the geographical and geological surveys and explorations west of the one hundredth meridian, during the last two years. The story is not burdened with technical terms or scientific observations, but records the wild and picturesque Western wilds and some of the pleasant incidents of camp life. Happy the youth that can thus begin life, with just enough excitement to keep the blood active, of exercise to keep the form strong, and an instructive companion to give an intellectual zest to bodily labor. There are some thrilling stories of hairbreadth escapes from savages in unexpected ways, and some graceful and graphic descriptions of natural scenery, &c.; that of the miraculous mesa country, or table land, in Northern Arizona, is strange as a story of Sir John Maundeville.







Sam. M. Webb

Engraved by J. H. Smith & Co. New York

## MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

VOL. IV

JUNE 1880

No. 6

### THE HUDSON RIVER AND ITS EARLY NAMES

THE vast streams of this Western Continent flowed over a nameless course during that mysterious past whose secrets we would so gladly unveil. There are rivers on the globe, like the Jordan, the Euphrates, the Nile, the Tiber, which are known to have borne during thousands of years the names they bear to-day. But this Western hemisphere, shrouded in mystery, has no primeval names to repeat to us for the noble streams flowing from its heart. The wild races, succeeding each other on their banks, no doubt gave temporary names to different portions of the greater streams, changing them with the succeeding conquest or flight of each tribe. The rivers of this Continent appear to have been of less importance to the people roaming along their banks than the streams of the Eastern hemisphere have been, even from remote ages, to the inhabitants of Europe and Asia. The ancient Western tribes were not a seafaring race. There were no Argonauts among them; there were no sea-kings to lead their clans afloat. Short voyages from isle to isle, from continent to Gulf Island, made up their nautical life. Apparently they seldom moved in large fleets. Their great migrations were nomadic, by land, in armed tribes, like those of Central Asia in the Middle Ages. Their largest semi-civilized towns, when first discovered by the white race, were not found on the sea-coast at the mouth of great rivers. They were built rather in the mountain fastnesses, like Mexico, or Cuzco, or in the depths of the forest, like Palenque. The recently-discovered ruins in Arizona and New Mexico, "whose memorial has perished with them," were not found at the mouth of the Colorado or the Gila, but clinging to the cliffs in gloomy cañons. Thus much we seem to see dimly through the mists which hang over the unwritten past. The greatest rivers of this wonderful hemisphere appear to have flowed over a grand, lonely course to the ocean during thousands of years.

The names these streams bear to-day they have received, as a general rule, from the European race. The Mississippi may be an exception.